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THE GOVERNMENT OF BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS
ON THE RULE OF "ONE SHARE,
ONE VOTE"
David L. Ratner-
Business corporations are the dominant institutions in American
society. The decisions of their managers shape our present and future
lives. The processes by which the selection of those managers, and the
decisions they make, are ratified or legitimized, are therefore of cen-
tral importance. Scholars have devoted thought to these processes, but
there has been almost no effort to relate that thought to existing or
potential legal mechanisms for control.
This article is a tentative effort to cross that gap by relating schol-
arly analysis of corporate government to a particular legal datum-
the rule of "one share, one vote." I have not attempted to erect a new
framework, but have rather made a series of thrusts at the rule from
different points of view, followed by an extremely preliminary con-
sideration of alternatives. If the thrusts are well-directed, the subse-
quent erection of a new framework can be undertaken with more
confidence about the footing.
OVERTURE: GAMEs PEoPLE PLAY
There are three games of Corporations. They are played by dif-
ferent people, on different boards, and with different rules.
Corporations I is played on a board with fifty squares, called
States. The players are called Corporation Lawyers, and they form
* The initial work on this article was done in the summer of 1966 under a research
grant from Cornell University.
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B. 1952, LL.B. 1955, Harvard University.
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themselves into teams, called Bar Association Committees. There are
two types of pieces used in the game-small pieces called Businessmen
and large pieces called Corporations. The large pieces are carefully
designed by the Corporation Lawyers to look just like the Businessmen,
except of course that they are much larger. Within the States there
are obstructions which sometimes prevent the large pieces from moving
in the direction that the Corporation Lawyers want to move them.
The object of the game is to change the rules in each State to elimi-
nate the obstructions. This process is called Modernizing the Corpora-
tion Laws. (Actually it consists of substituting nineteenth-century ideas
for eighteenth-century ideas, but since the game became popular in
the nineteenth century the term Modernizing is still used.) The Corpo-
ration Lawyers who are proficient at this game win large amounts of
money, but since all the teams are on the same side, it is not a very
interesting game to watch.
Corporations II is not played on a board, but with a large box
called a Corporation. Inside the box are piles of money. One group of
players is inside the box. They are called Insiders. The Insiders are
allowed to take money, but there are rules as to how much money they
can take, or how fast or how far they can go, on any one move. There
are a few small holes cut in the box through which players outside
the box can watch the Insiders. If an outside player thinks he sees
one of the Insiders make an illegal move, he shouts "Breach of Fidu-
ciary Dutyl" An outside player who shouts this is called a Strike Suiter.
Since the rules are not written down, a referee has to be called in to see
whether the move was really illegal. If the move was legal, the Insider
can keep the money. If the move was illegal, the Insider must put
the money back on the pile, and the referee then pays half of it to the
Strike Suiter. (Under the old rules, the Insider could pay half to the
Strike Suiter and keep the other half, without calling in the referee,
but this is no longer permitted.) This game is a lot more fun to watch
than the first game.
Corporations III is also played with a large open box, called The
Corporation. The box is kept in a luxuriously appointed gaming hall,
colloquially called a Think Tank, which is always found in an area
with a very nice climate and many recreation facilities. Inside the box
are piles of money, and pieces of different shapes and sizes with such
names as Workers, Shareholders, and Creditors. There is also a group
of players inside the box called Corporate Managers, who move the
money and the pieces around in some pattern. The other group of
players, called Scholars, are outside the box. They come into the gain-
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ing hall after tennis, or swimming, or skin diving, and watch the ac-
tivities of the Corporate Managers. Then they sit around a table and
try to guess what rules the Corporate Managers are following in mak-
ing their moves. The Scholars who make the cleverest guesses are
invited back to play another round at the expense of the gaming hall.
Nobody is allowed to watch the game while it is being played, but
the guesses made by the Scholars are usually reported in special books
with paper covers, which some people read.
I
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE VIEWS
A. An Excursion into Antiquity
The Corporation textbooks do not say much about the develop-
ment of the rule of one vote per share in business corporations. Ac-
cording to Ballantine, "[a]t common law . . . each member [of a
corporation] was entitled to one vote, and no more," but this "rule
was adopted with respect to public corporations and private corpora-
tions not having a capital stock, and at a time when joint stock
corporations were unknown . .. . It is generally expressly provided
... by a statute or by by-laws, that stockholders shall have one vote
for each share held by them."'
This explanation does not tell us much, and what it does tell us
is misleading. The problem of shareholder voting was recognized at
the earliest stages-of the development of business corporations in Eng-
land, 400 years ago, and a variety of approaches were developed in
response to economic and social needs over the succeeding years.
Through the early part of the seventeenth century, the charters of
the joint stock companies, each of which was specially granted by the
King, generally made no special provision for the relationship of shares
to voting rights, leaving this to the by-laws. 2 However, the charter of
the Mines Royal in 1568 provided for one vote for each quarter of a
share, the total capital being divided into twenty-four shares.3 Since
the project was a joint venture of Englishmen and Germans, between
whom there was some "friction and suspicion,"4 this provision was
1 H. BALLANTINE, MANUAL OF CORPORATE LAW AND PRAcnmE § 171, at 573 (1930).
2 1 W. Scow, THE CONsrrUnoN AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOrISH AND IRISH
JOINT-SToCK COMPANIES TO 1720, at 162-63 (1912).
3 SEL.cr CHARTF OF TADING COMPANmS 1530-1707, at 14-15 (Selden Soc'y ed. 1913).
See also 1 W. ScoTr, supra note 2, at 163.
4 SELECT CHARTERS OF TRADING COMPANIES 1530-1707, supra note 3, at xdv.
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presumably inserted to assure continued English control of the opera-
tion, regardless of the number of German shareholders.5
The charter of the Mineral and Battery Works, also granted in
1568, had voting provisions similar to those of the Mines Royal. By
1574 it had produced an alleged abuse of fiduciary duty by a control-
ling stockholder who acquired between one-fifth and one-quarter of
the shares and used his voting power, together with allegedly fraudu-
lent accounts, to procure a reduction in the rent that he and two other
stockholders paid for property they leased from the company."
Not surprisingly, in the companies whose charters did not specify
the manner of voting, controversies arose when the result of the elec-
tion would differ depending on whether each shareholder had one
vote or one vote for each share. A principal issue in the controversy
between the Smythe and Sandys factions for control of the Virginia
and Somers Island Companies between 1618 and 1625 was whether
voting should be by ballot, in which case each member would have
one vote, or by a poll in which members would be entitled to one
vote for each share.7 And in 1637, when the members of the Merchant
Adventurers, on a vote by ballot, refused to accept the man "recom-
mended" by King Charles I as the company's deputy in Rotterdam,
"the King in Council ordered that, in future, no company should
use a ballot-box in the conduct of its business."8
By the latter part of the seventeenth century, it became more
common to specify voting rights in the charter and three distinct pat-
terns emerged. As Scott describes it:
On the one side, there were a number of companies in which there
was no limitation, for instance in the White Paper Makers, the
Saltpetre company, that for digging Mines and the Hampstead
Aqueducts each share entitled the holder to one vote. On the other
hand, while there was no undertaking which followed what is said
to have been the method of a regulated company, namely the deci-
sion of controverted questions by a poll of persons, the Bank of
England approached near to this rule, since it was decreed that
no member should have more than one vote. The difference lay
5 A return made in 1571 showed that 14 shares were owned by 22 Englishmen, and
the remaining 10 shares by an unspecified number of Germans. 2 W. ScoTr, supra note
2, at 387.
6 1 id. at 58-59. '"When one recollects the amount of discussion that has centred
round 'controlling interests' ... in recent years, it is not uninstructive to notice how soon
the evil manifested itself." Id. at 59.
7 2 id. at 266-88. Sandys also tried to introduce the ballot box at the election of the
East India Company in 1619. Id. at 106.
8 1 id. at 228 (footnote omitted). It is tempting to infer from this incident an historical
affinity of autocrats for the "one share, one vote" rule.
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in the fact that those, who owned less than £500 stock, had no vot-
ing-power. Similarly in the Million Bank £300 of stock entitled the
holder to one vote and no one might have more than one. In the
Royal Lustring company 10 shares (£250) conferred a single vote,
which in this case also was the maximum allowed to each member.
There was a third group which aimed at a compromise between the
extreme tendencies. Like the Bank of England, £500 stock in the
Greenland company gave a right to one vote, £1,000 stock to two,
the latter being the maximum for any person. According to the
constitution of Barbon's land bank, £300 stock qualified for two
votes, £500 stock for three votes, £1,000 stock for five votes-
the latter being the maximum. In the company for smelting Iron
with Pit-coal the maximum was four votes, in the Scots Linen
manufacture five votes. In some cases, where no express maximum
is mentioned, there was still a limit to the votes of any shareholder,
arising out of the restriction which limited the amount of stock
or shares that might be subscribed for or owned by a member.
Thus in the Bank of Scotland each £1,000 Scots carried one vote,
subject to the proviso that no one might take up more than £20,000
Scots; and in the society of White writing and printing Paper,
while each five shares gave a vote, the maximum holding was 20
shares. The final step in this tendency, as it existed in the seven-
teenth century, was made by the charter of the Old East India com-
pany (1698), which introduced a sliding scale, but not a uniformly
progressive one.9
The third pattern appears to have become the dominant one in
English business companies during the eighteenth century, so that,
while large shareholders were almost always entitled to more votes
than small shareholders, there was "[n]evertheless, almost universally,
in order to prevent the concentration of control . .. a relatively low
maximum number of votes that any one proprietor might cast."' 0
In America, there were very few business corporations or joint
stock companies in existence before the Revolution.'1 One of the few
was William Penn's Free Society of Traders in Pennsylvania, chart-
ered in England in 1682, in which shareholders not resident in Penn-
sylvania were restricted to one vote, while those who owned at least
1,000 acres of inhabited land in the province were allowed two votes
for two shares and three votes for six shares or more.'2
More than 300 private corporations for business purposes were
9 Id. at 340-41 (footnotes omitted).
10 A. DuBois, THE ENGLISH BusINEss COMPANY AFTER Tm BuBBLE Acr 1720-1800, at
288 (1938). For specific examples see id. at 316-17 nn. 48-50.
11 2 J. DAvis, EssAYs IN THE EARIER HistoRy OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 4 (1917).
12 1 id. at 42.
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chartered in the United States between the Revolution and 1801,'1
of which two-thirds were transportation or water companies or other-
wise of a "quasi-public character." 14 The charters evidenced the same
variations as English companies of the same period:
Voting rights were usually not mentioned in water company
charters, where the rule of one vote for each proprietor may have
been general through this period; in Massachusetts bridge charters,
which were notably free; and in occasional other charters, such as
the congressional charter to the bank of North America (1781).
From the outset, however, most charters specified voting rights.
These were usually limited in one way or another. A maximum of
ten votes, or sometimes twenty, was common, and well-nigh uni-
versal in case of turnpike companies. Higher maxima were common
in insurance companies. Frequently a complicated system was drawn
up giving less and less weight per share as the size of the holdings
increased. Alexander Hamilton, arguing for such a scheme in his
report on the "National bank," said:
"A vote for each share renders a combination between a
few principal stockholders, to monopolize the power and bene-
fits of the bank, too easy. An equal vote to each stockholder
. . . allows not that degree of weight to large stockholders
which it is reasonable they should have, and which, perhaps,
their security, and that of the bank, require. A prudent mean is
to be preferred."
The tendency was, however, for these limitations to be relaxed
toward a simple vote per share basis. This was done, probably
invariably, at the request of the corporations, probably under pres-
sure from those who were or would be large holders. And voting
rights of one per share were specified in occasional charters, notably
in those of the Bank of North America (Pennsylvania charter, 1782),
the Massachusetts Bank (1784), the New Jersey manufacturing
society (1791), and the New Haven Insurance Company (1797). 15
The restrictions on voting rights were at least in part attributable to
widespread public concern that grants of power to corporations and
those who controlled them would weaken democratic government. 16
This concern may have been reinforced by the "tendency to concen-
tration of ownership" already apparent at the end of the eighteenth
century, particularly in the more promising enterprises.' 7
13 2 id. at 8.
14 Baldwin, Private Corporations, in Two CENTURIES' GROWTH oF AMERICN LAw
1701-1901, at 261, 276 (1901).
15 2 J. DAvis, supra note 11, at 323-24, quoting M. CLARK & D. HALL, BANK oF TH
UNrrED SATrEs 28 (1832) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
-16 2 J. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 304.
17 Id. at 302.
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The nineteenth century saw the gradual substitution of general
incorporation laws for private acts of incorporation. The early gen-
eral incorporation laws, however, showed the same variations as the
special laws that preceded them.
New York's general law for manufacturing corporations, enacted
in 1811, specified that "each stockholder shall be entitled to as many
votes as he owns shares of the stock of the said company.. . ."I and
the Connecticut and Michigan statutes of 1837 followed the same pat-
tern,19 while New Jersey provided for one vote per share unless other-
wise specified.20 However, New York's 1807 general incorporation law
for turnpike companies specified one vote for every share up to ten,
and one vote for every five shares above that,21 a provision which
appears to have survived until the general corporation law revision of
1890.22
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts experimented with various meth-
ods of limiting the voting power of any single stockholder. The
Pennsylvania act of 1836 gave a stockholder one vote for each share
up to two, for each two shares above two and up to ten, for each four
shares above ten and up to thirty, for each ten shares above thirty
and up to 100, and for each twenty shares above 10.3 This formula
was abandoned in 1849 in favor of a provision that "each stockholder
shall be entitled to as many votes as he owns shares of stock in said
company, but no person shall in any case be entitled to more than
one-third of the whole number of votes to which the holders of all
the shares would... be entitled .... ,,24 This restriction was finally
eliminated by the Corporation Act of 1874.25
Massachusetts made no mention of voting rights in its general
incorporation laws for manufacturing companies in 1809 and 1830.25,
In the laws governing special kinds of corporations, however, while
votes were on a per-share basis up to a certain point, a stockholder in
a bank was limited to ten votes,27 a stockholder in an insurance com-
18 Act of March 22, 1811, ch. 67, § 3, [1811] N.Y. Laws 112.
19 Act of June 10, 1837, ch. 63, § 9, [1836-37] Conn. Pub. Acts 49; Act of March 22,
1837, No. 121, § 3, [1837] Mich. Laws 285.
20 Act of Feb. 25, 1846, § 11, [1846] NJ. Laws 66.
21 Act of March 13, 1807, ch. 38, [1807] N.Y. Laws 104.
22 See Act of June 7, 1890, ch. 564, § 54, [1890] N.Y. Laws 1077.
23 Act of June 16, 1836, No. 194, § 3, [1835-36] Pa. Laws 800.
24 Act of April 7, 1849, No. 868, § 4, [1849] Pa. Laws 564.
25 Act of April 29, 1874, No. 32, § 10, [1874] Pa. Laws 79.
26 Act of March 8, 1809, ch. 65, [1809] Mass. Laws 464; Act of Feb. 23, 1880, ch. 58,
[1829-80] Mass. Laws 325.
27 MAss. REv. STAT. pt. 1, tit. 13, ch. 86, § 28 (1836).
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pany to thirty votes, 28 and a stockholder in a railroad was not "entitled
to any vote for any shares beyond one tenth part of the whole number
of shares ... of stock ... ."29 The restriction on voting in railroads
appears to have been eliminated in 1906,30 and that on banks in 1910.31
Restrictions on voting in insurance companies were not completely
eliminated until 1928.32 In manufacturing companies, Massachusetts
tried a different approach by providing that no person could vote more
than fifty shares as proxy unless they were all owned by one person,
and that no officer of the corporation could cast more than twenty
votes as proxy or attorney.33 This restriction, too, disappeared by
1902.34
North Carolina's general incorporation law of 1836, for silk and
sugar companies, gave one vote for each share up to five and one vote
for each five shares above that,3 5 but the broader general incorporation
law of 1850 left the matter of voting to be prescribed by the by-laws,30
as did the first general incorporation law of Delaware.37
In England, the Companies Act of 1862 provided that in default
of regulations each member should have one vote,38 but the suggested
regulations contained in the first schedule to the Act provided for one
vote for each share up to ten, for each five shares above ten up to 100,
and for each ten shares above 100.39 These provisions were eliminated
in 1908 in favor of a provision that on a poll each stockholder would
have a vote for each share.40
By the end of the nineteenth century, then, statutory restrictions
on the rule of one vote per share in business corporations had virtually
disappeared, and it is now unusual to find a statutory reference to any
formula other than one vote per share.41
28 Act of March 6, 1832-, ch. 95, § 3, [1831-33] Mass. Laws 334.
29 MAss. REV. STAT. pt. 1, tit. 13, ch. 39, § 50 (1836).
30 Act of June 7, 1906, ch. 463, pt. 2, § 37, [1906] Mass. Acts & Resolves 521.
31 See Act of April 14, 1910, ch. 399, § 14, [1910] Mass. Acts & Resolves 335.
32 Act of April 2, 1928, ch. 185, [1928] Mass. Acts & Resolves 205.
33 MAss. GEN. STAT. ch. 60, § 7 (1860). Dodd found Massachusetts during this period
far more prone than New York to discourage concentration of control in the hands of
large shareholders. Dodd, American Business Association Law, in 3 LAw, A CENTuRy oF
PROGpxESS 254, 273 (1937).
34 MASs. REv. LA-ws ch. 110, § 25 (1902).
35 2 N.C. Rav. STAT. 216, at § 4 (1837).
86 N.C. REv. CODE ch. 26, § 2 (1855).
87 Act of March 14, 1883, ch. 147, § 18, [1883] Del. Laws 221.
38 Companies Act of 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89, § 52.
39 Id. § 44, sched. 1.
40 Corporations (Consolidation) Act, 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, § 60, sched. 1 (1908).
41 Under Vermont law, the articles of association or by-laws of a corporation
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This brief history indicates that the emergence of a general rule
of one vote per share did not result from enlightened awareness of the
inadequacies of an inappropriate common law rule, but was the nine-
teenth-century culmination of a 300-year political controversy over the
degree and type of control that should be retained over the managers
of corporations chartered for economic purposes. Indeed, there is no
real indication that any common law rule of one vote for each member
of a business corporation ever existed.
The case most often cited for such a proposition is the 1834 deci-
sion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Taylor v. Griswold,42 in-
validating a by-law provision of a bridge company which purported
to give one vote for each share. The court did not cite any earlier
decisions on the question; its only direct authority was a statement in
Angell and Ames's treatise on corporations that "[i]n joint stock com-
panies, the owner of one share or action of the capital stock, is, in
general, a member of the company; a corporator; and as such, entitled
to, and cannot be denied, the entire rights and privileges of a mem-
ber."48 The court went on to state that
[t]hose rights and privileges... cannot be different in one member,
than they are in an other.... A man with one share is as much
a member, as a man with fifty; and it is difficult to perceive any
"may provide that each stockholder shall have one vote for each share of stock held by him,
or that each stockholder shall have but one vote, regardless of the amount of stock held
by him .... " VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 64(a)(4) (1958). In the absence of any provision,
stockholders apparently have one vote for each share. Id. § 64(d).
There appears to have been at least one area where the trend was in the opposite
direction. An 1859 Wisconsin law authorizing mutual insurance companies based voting
rights "not on the democratic principle of one vote per person but on a property-oriented
principle of one vote for each $200 of insurance." S. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POL-
icy 71 (1960). However, as a result of a continuing campaign, this rule was abandoned in
favor of the democratic voting principle in 1929. Id.
42 14 NJ.L. 222 (Sup. Ct. 1834).
43 Id. at 237, quoting J. ANGELL & S. AmEs, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 62 (1832). The
statement in Angell and Ames, however, related solely to the right of a person who bought
stock in a joint stock corporation to become a member without a vote of admission.
None of the editions of Angell and Ames from 1832 to 1882 discussed the question of
the number of votes to which a shareholder was entitled. Morawetz, in 1886, believed
"the custom of giving the shareholders . . . a vote for every share has become so well
established that it is fair to imply an intention to follow this custom in the absence of
any indication to the contrary." 1 V. MORAwaZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 476 (2d ed.
1886). See also W. COOK, STocK AND STOCKHOLDERS § 608 (1887). Clark reached the same
conclusion in 1897, and believed that "this is dearly the just rule, for stockholders are in-
terested not equally, but in proportion to the number of shares held by them." W. CLAR,
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 477 (1897). He did note, however, that "often the number of votes
which a single stockholder shall be allowed to cast is limited. The object is to prevent
the corporation from getting into the control of a single person." Id. at 476.
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substantial difference between a by-law, excluding a member with
one share from voting at all, and a by-law reducing his one vote
to a cipher, by giving another member fifty or a hundred votes.44
The court noted that the legislature had "thought proper, in some
instances" to give one vote for each share in corporate charters and
in other cases had provided for graduated voting. The court believed,
however, that as a policy matter, it should not permit the members
of the corporation to adopt such a rule in the absence of specific legis-
lative aithority, since
the tendency, at least, the apparent tendency, of the by-law in ques-
tion, is to encourage speculation and monopoly, to lessen the rights
of the smaller stockholders, depreciate the value of their shares,
and throw the whole property and government of the company,
into the hands of a few capitalists; and it may be, to the utter
neglect or disregard of the public convenience and interest 45
What this opinion seems to indicate is not a rigid adherence to
an old common law rule, since there does not seem to have been any,40
but rather a judicial reluctance to abandon traditional democratic
principles for the government of business corporations unless the leg-
islature evidenced a clear intent to abandon them. The persistence of
this judicial concern can be seen in an 1890 decision by the Supreme
Court of Alabama upholding the effectiveness of a provision inserted
by the legislature in the charter of a coal and iron company, prohibit-
ing any person from casting "more than one-fourth of all the votes
at any election of directors." 47 Another company, which had bought
a majority of the shares, attempted to evade the prohibition by putting
some of its shares in the names of its officers and directors. The court
thought
the statutory restraint on the voting power of the stockholders was
enacted for very wise and conservative purposes .... It is perhaps
to be lamented that our organic law does not contain a provision
applicable to all business corporations aggregate, that no one per-
44 14 N.J.L. at 237-38 (emphasis in original).
45 Id. at 241 (emphasis in original).
46 The other case most often cited for the "common law rule" is Commonwealth v.
Conover, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 55 (C.P. 1873), in which the court stated, without authority:
We think it may with safety be assumed, that at common law, the rights of the
members of a corporation stand upon the principle, that all are equal in the en-
joyment of franchises granted, unless the contrary appears on the face of the
charter . . ...
Id. at 56. Since this case involved the Vesper Yacht Club of Philadelphia, it did not
involve any examination of the merits of voting procedures in business corporations.
47 Mack v. De Bardelaben Coal & Iron Co., 90 Ala. 396, 401, 8 So. 150, 152 (1890).
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son, whether natural or artificial, can ever exercise a controlling
voice in their organization or government.4 8
B. Perspectives from the Civilian49
In many of the leading commercial countries with civil law sys-
tems, the corporation law modifies the prevailing rule of one vote per
share either by restricting the number of votes that any one stockholder
can cast or by specifically authorizing the inclusion of such a limita-
tion in the articles of incorporation.
Sweden, Argentina, Colombia, and Belgium limit the proportion
of the shares represented at a meeting that may be voted by any one
stockholder, the proportion being one-fifth in Sweden 0 and Argen-
tina,51 one-quarter in Colombia, 52 and two-fifths in Belgium.53 In addi-
48 Id. at 403, 8 So. at 152.
49 The research for this part was hampered both by the difficulty in obtaining
up-to-date information on the law and practice in various countries and by difficulty in
reading the languages in which certain of the materials were found. The specific references
should therefore be taken more as indicative than definitive.
50 Stock Corporation Act of 1944, § 119(4), as amended, in CORPORATION LAws OF
SWEDEN 79 (Foreign Tax Law Ass'n 1965). A stockholder may be required to make a written
declaration that he is the real owner of the shares he is voting and did not acquire them
for the purpose of evading any restrictions contained in the law or the articles of
association, particularly those relating to voting rights. The company's rules, however, can
eliminate the restriction and give one vote per share. K. RODHE, AKTiEBOLAGSRXTr 113 (1964).
51 C6DIGO DE COMERCIO art. 350 (de Zavalfa 1968). The Argentine provision has been
criticized on the ground that, because it is too easily avoided, it does not achieve its
objective. 1 V. RivARoLA, SocnADEs; ANONIMAS 150-52 (5th ed. 1957). It would be elim-
inated in a proposed revision of the corporation laws because, in the great majority of
Argentine corporations that have bearer shares, the ease with which accommodation trans-
fers can be made renders the limitation virtually unenforceable. ANTEPROYErCTO E LEY
GEN EAL BE SocIEDADEs 32 (1967).
52 Law No. 58 of 1931, art. 28, in THE COMMERCIAL CODE OF COLOMBIA 405 (Foreign.
Tax Law Ass'n 1965). See V. RUEDA, LAws oF COLOMBIA IN MATrERs AFFECING BusiNESS
45 (3d ed. 1961). This limitation was reconfirmed and elaborated in Decree No. 2521 of
1950, art. 90, in THE COMMERCIAL CODE OF COLOMBIA, supra at 517. It would be carried
forward in Article 592 of the new Commercial Code submitted by a committee of revision
in 1958. 1 PRoYEcrO DE C6DIGO DE COMERCIO 129 (1958). This limitation was made inappli-
cable to government holdings in public service companies. Decree No. 2521 of 1950, art. 91,
in THE COMMERCIAL CODE OF COLOMBIA, supra at 518. Problems have arisen in applying it
to majority-owned subsidiaries of other companies. See J. BENErn SALGAa, DE LA AsmBLEA
GENER.AL BE AcCIONISTAS 50-56 (1963).
53 Law of 1935, art. 76, in COMMERCIAL LAws OF BELGIUM: 12 (Foreign Tax Law Ass'n
1965). The workings of this provision are described in A. GRFcoItE, MANUEL DES Socdrs
ANONYmEs 63-66 (1968). A recent project for the revision of Belgian corporation law
proposes its elimination because it is objectionable in principle to the system of decision
by majority vote, and because the ease with which it can be evaded by the use of nominees




tion, two of these countries limit the proportion of the issued shares
that any one stockholder may vote-one-tenth in Argentina 4 and one-
fifth in Belgium. 55
Uruguay has the strictest limitation: no person may represent more
than six votes (three, if the corporation has less than 100 shares),56
and the restriction has been interpreted as applying to persons voting
as proxies for others as well as to those voting for their own account.57
The laws of France, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, Den-
mark, and Brazil specifically authorize inclusion in the articles of in-
corporation of provisions limiting the number of votes that may be
cast by any one stockholder.
The basic French rule, carried over into the 1966 corporation law,
is that the number of votes to which stockholders are entitled is pro-
portional to the aggregate par value of the shares which they own.58
However, the articles may limit the number of votes that any single
stockholder may cast at any meeting of shareholders, 59 provided that
limitation is uniform for all shares.60 Limitations of this sort, such as a
provision that no stockholder may cast more than ten votes at the an-
nual meeting, are reportedly frequently employed. 61
The German Corporation Law of 1965 carries forward the pro-
vision of the prior law that the voting rights of large stockholders may
be limited in the articles of incorporation either by fixing a maximum
54 C6DIGO DE CoMERcio art. 350 (de Zavalla 1968).
55 Law of 1935, art. 76, in COMMERCIAL LAWS op BELGIUM, supra note 53.
56 C6DIo DE COMERCIO art. 420 (Barreiro y Ramos 1964). This formula was adapted
from the Dutch Commercial Code of 1826. See Decree of May 26, 1949, in id. at 377.
57 Decree of May 26, 1949, in id. at 377. Even this low limit is apparently "qualified
in practice through the splitting of the votes by calling in nominee shareholders."
J. OTARRELL & C. FREIRA, COMPANY, TAXATION, AND BANKING LAWs IN URUGUAY 2 (2d ed.
1959).
5i8 Law No. 537 of July 24, 1966, art. 174, in A. DALSACE, MANUEL DES Socskris
ANONYMES 403 (4th ed. 1967). See also Law of Nov. 13, 1933, art. 4, in CODE DR COMIERCE
art. 46 (60e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1964); E. CHURCH, BUSINEss AssociAToNs UNDER FRENCH
LAW § 351 (1960).
59 Law No. 537 of July 24, 1966, art. 177, in A. DALSAcE, supra note 58. Under the
old law, the limitation apparently could only be made applicable to voting at annual
meetings. Law of July 24, 1867, art. 27, in CODE DE CommERCE art. 46 (60e ed. Petits Codes
Dalloz 1964).
o Law No. 537 of July 24, 1966, art. 177, in A. DALAE, supra note 58. In a 1957 deci-
sion, the Court of Appeals of Paris upheld a provision limiting any shareholder to 30 votes,
reasoning that the provision was designed to protect a company formed by small investors
from coming under the control of capitalists motivated by speculative considerations. The
court also held that a shareholder representing himself and others at a meeting could vote
the sum of all the shares they would severally have been entitled to vote. 3 H. MoREAU,
LA SociarA ANONYME § 272 (2d ed. Supp. 1955).
61 H. MOREAU, H. BRESSAC & 0. MCCANDLESS, FRENCH COPORAONS 12 (1956).
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number of votes or by scaling down voting rights as the number of
shares increases. 62 To facilitate enforcement of such limitations, the
articles may also provide that shares held by one stockholder for the
account of another may be included in the latter's holdings in deter-
mining the applicability of the limitation.63
One special German provision is found in the law providing for
the transfer of the Volkswagen Company to public ownership, which
limits each stockholder to a number of votes equal to the number
that would be conferred by ownership of one ten-thousandth of the
outstanding shares. 64 This provision was apparently a significant factor
in preventing a merger of Volkswagen and Daimler-Benz, since the
latter company "is closely held, and its owners presumably don't want
to yield control of their company for Volkswagen stock they can't
vote."6 5
In Switzerland, the articles may limit the number of votes that
a single stockholder may cast,6 6 and the transfer of shares for the pur-
pose of exercising voting rights at a meeting is prohibited if made for
the purpose of avoiding such limitations.67
The Dutch corporation law has rather complex provisions. The
articles may either (a) restrict the number of votes any one holder may
cast, provided that holders of equal numbers of shares are entitled to
equal number of votes and that the restriction does not favor large
shareholders over small shareholders, or (b) deviate from the rule of
one vote per share in any other way, provided that no shareholder may
cast more than six votes (three, if the corporation has fewer than 100
shares outstanding).6 8 A provision limiting each shareholder to six
votes is apparently frequently found in the articles of large corpora-
tion. 69
62 Law of Sept. 6, 1965, § 134(1), [19 65] BGB1. I 1120.
63 Id.
64 Law of July 21, 1960, § 2(1), [1960] BGBI. I 585.
65 Wall St. J., June 30, 1966, at 4, col. 4.
66 SCMVEIZERISCHES OBLIGATIONENRECHT art. 692 (Schulthess & Co. 1966). Prior to 1937,
Swiss law limited any single shareholder to one-fifth of the votes represented at a meeting,
and many companies have kept or adopted this provision, either because they liked it
or did not notice the change in the statute. 2 G. BROssET & C. ScHmIDT, GuIDE DES SociArfs
EN DRorr SuissE 92 (1963). However, many other companies reportedly fix a maximum
number of votes that any single shareholder may cast, or scale down the voting rights of
large shareholders. P. BCLI, DAs AKTIENSTIMmRECHT uND SEINE AUSBUNG D.URCH
STu.vaRTaErER 43-48 (1961).
67 ScMuEIzERIscHES OBLIGATIONEN.ECHT art. 691 (Schulthess & Co. 1966).
68 CojnmCIAL CODE art. 44b, in DUTCH CORPORATION LAw 19 (S. van der Meer
traml. 1960).
69 SUCCURSALES Er FxILIMs DANS LE MARCHA COMrau 165 (Dalloz & Sirey 1963).
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Denmark added a new section to its Companies Act in 1962, per-
mitting a corporation, at a general meeting of stockholders, to adopt
a provision that no shareholder may possess voting rights for more
than a specified proportion of the voting shares.70 The provision must
be approved by the holders of four-fifths of the outstanding voting
shares; dissenters have the right to require the corporation to purchase
their shares.7 1
Brazil simply permits the articles to establish limitations on the
number of votes of each shareholder, in derogation of the general
rule of one vote per share. 2
Japan, before World War II, authorized inclusion in the articles
of a provision limiting the voting rights of stockholders having eleven
or more shares;73 this authorization disappeared in a 1950 amend-
ment of the Commercial Code during the American occupation.7 4 The
Italian pre-War code also scaled down the voting rights of holders of
more than five shares; this restriction was eliminated in the 1942 code
revision in favor of a rule of one vote per share.7 5
It has been suggested that a mandatory restriction such as that
found in Argentina, Belgium, and Uruguay "scarcely works in prac-
tice, since the holder of a large number of shares will make a fictional
transfer of them before the meeting." 70 This may well be true in
Argentina or Belgium because the limits are so high, but a stockholder
in a large Uruguayan corporation might be hard pressed to round up
enough "fictional transferees" with a limit of six votes for each. The
restrictions have also been criticized on the ground that large share-
holders have the greatest interest in the prosperity of the company and
that their opinions are more enlightened than those of small share-
70 Act No. 225 of June 22, 1962, § 57a, in THE DANISH COMPANIES Aar, at App. (Supp.
1962).
71 Id.
72 Law No. 2627 of Sept. 26, 1940, art. 80, in COMMERCIAL LAis OF BRAzIL 32
(Foreign Tax Law Ass'n 1965).
73 COMMERCIAL CODE art. 241, in CIVIL AFFAIRS HANDBOOK: JAPAN 28 (W. Sebald
transl. 1945).
74 COMMmCIAL CODE art. 241, in CODE DE COMMERCE DU JAPON 78 (S. Komachiya ed.
& transl. 1954). The amendments were reportedly made under pressure from the occupation
forces to remodel Japanese corporation law to correspond to American law. CODE DE
COMMERCE DU JA 'ON, supra at 14-18. Elimination of the possibility of restrictions on large
shareholders has been characterized as a strengthening of voting rights "through the
abolition of restrictions." Blakemore & Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revisions, 2
Ar. J. CoMP. L. 12, 20 (1953).
75 1 V. PrvARoLA, supra note 51, at 150. See CODICE DI COMMERcio art. 157 (2d ed.
Barbdrh 1893); COMMENTADO art. 2351 (Laporta & Tamburrino 1963).








A. Sales of Control
Fifteen years ago, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit handed down its decision in Perlman v. Feldmann7s and
inaugurated a new era in discussion of the issue of sale of corporate
control. The literature spawned by that decision and the succeeding
elaboration of the problem by the same court in Essex Universal Corp.
v. Yates79 has been impressive not only in its bulk, but also in the stat-
ure of the gladiators who have entered the arena and the subtlety and
elaboration of what they have written. 0
Yet, having reviewed this vast outpouring, and having compared
the latest contributions with the earliest, and the most recent court
decisions, such as Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.,81 with Perlman it-
self, it is evident that we are no closer to the development of a useful
rule or rules for the guidance of prospective buyers and sellers of con-
trol-or even to an understanding of what the question is-than we
were fifteen years ago.
The reason for this colossal failure, I suggest, is that the examina-
tion has been limited to a surface manifestation of a much more
serious question about the structure of American corporation law, and
that until that other question is exposed and analyzed, there can be
neither a solution to, nor an understanding of, the problem of sale
of control.
The problem has arisen in the context of a corporation whose
77 1 V. 17VAROLA, supra note 51, at 152.
78 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
79 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
80 E.g., Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CAirF. L. RFV. 1 (1956); Leech,
Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. Rv. 725 (1956); Hill, The Sale of
Controlling Shares, 70 HA~y. L. Rv. 986 (1957); Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law,
58 CoLum. L. Rav. 1212 (1958); Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control,
50 CoRNELr L.Q. 628 (1965); Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in
the Sale of Shares, 78 HARv. L. REy. 505 (1965); Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of
Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews, 32 U. CnI. L. R Ev. 420 (1965). A series
of articles have been written on the subject by Father Bayne, all cited in Bayne, The Sale
of Control Premium: The Disposition, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 615, 618 n.33 (1969).




stock is widely distributed but in which one person, or a small group
of people, owns substantially more stock than anyone else. This is the
so-called "control stock," and the problem arises when the owner of
this stock sells it-usually at a premium over the market price for
small quantities of the same stock-and passes to the buyer the power
to control the corporation.
The basic issue to which all the commentators have addressed
themselves is what limitations should be placed on the right of the
seller to pass control of the corporation in this manner without the
participation or consent of the other shareholders. They have all rec-
ognized one dilemma that complicates their labors: any restriction on
the right to transfer control must be cast in a form that also restricts
the free transferability of the underlying shares, and the free trans-
ferability of shares is quite properly recognized as a desirable means
to the optimum utilization of resources, an objective at least as im-
portant as ensuring that those in control of corporations respect the
rights of all shareholders.
There is, however, another dilemma to which they have not
turned their attention: the principal effect of any restriction that is
imposed by law and respected by a prospective seller of control may be
to prevent the transfer of control and leave it in the hands of the
prospective seller. Thus, the other stockholders are protected from hav-
ing control lodged in someone who is willing to purchase it at a pre-
mium by a rule that leaves it firmly lodged in someone who is willing
to sell it at a premium. It is hard to detect a sufficient difference in right-
eousness or responsiveness to fiduciary duty between the buyer and
seller in these situations to warrant an assumption that the other share-
holders will thereafter be treated any worse by the former than by the
latter.
The recognition of some limitation on the power of a controlling
shareholder to transfer control by selling his shares must lead inevi-
tably to the question whether there must not also be some correspond-
ing limitation on his right to control the corporation by virtue of his
ownership of the shares. To turn the question around, should the
ownership of the shares, by itself, give him any right to control the
corporation?
As far as management and control are concerned, there are two
functionally different kinds of corporations-privately-owned corpo-
rations and publicly-owned corporations. The determination of the
draftsmen of state corporation laws to force both kinds of corporations
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into the same statutory molds8 2 is responsible for much of the inade-
quacy of "modern" corporation law. The privately-owned corporation
is one in which the entire equity interest is owned by people who are,
or have been, actively involved in the conduct of the business, or are
related by personal or business ties to people who are. The publicly-
owned corporation is one in which some or all of the equity interest
is owned by a substantial number of people who acquired it in the
open market and have no other connection with the corporation and
its business.
In which category do we place the corporation that has "public"
shareholders but also has one or more large shareholders who par-
ticipate actively in the selection of management and in fact control
the selection process? It is clearly not the functional equivalent of a
privately-owned corporation. Looking at it as a publicly-held corpora-
tion, the question becomes whether the owner of a substantial block
of shares, whether a majority of the outstanding shares or not, should
be entitled to control the corporation through the selection of its
management.
Almost forty years ago, Berle and Means examined the problem
of the divorce of ownership and control in the public corporation. 3
The inquiry that has followed has concentrated on finding the most
appropriate agency for controlling the power of the managers in the
corporations whose scattered shareholders have demonstrated their in-
capacity for the task. This problem has not existed in those public
corporations in which one concentrated holding of shares was sufficient
to enable the holder to exercise ultimate control over the corpora-
tion's affairs. But there has been little analysis of whether this cure-
or, rather, preventive-is more beneficial to the remaining shareholders
than the ill of uncontrolled management discretion.84
82 This was prompted in large part, no doubt, by the desire of the managers of large
corporations, for political reasons, to maintain their protective coloration of identification
with small businessmen.
83 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
84 [T~he possibility should be considered that the public may be less in jeopardy
from a large business enterprise run by an unpropertied professional management
-one said not to be "accountable"--than from a large enterprise personally owned
and operated by an individual or a small family group. To whom is such an
individual or small family group "accountable"? It is perhaps unfair to recall that
before World War II the managers of the basic industry of Germany and of
Japan were directly "accountable" to their shareholders-the Krupps and the four
Zaibatsu families.
Manning, Corporate Power and Individual Freedom: Some General Analysis and Particu-
lar Observations, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 38, 41 (1960) (emphasis in original). On the specific is-
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In a corporation with no concentrated shareholdings, the most
effective control over management that has been developed during the
last thirty-five years is the requirement of disclosure-disclosure of
financial information, of transactions by insiders, of other types of in-
formation through which shareholders and others can measure man-
agement's performance against general standards of competence and
integrity. To some extent, disclosure is a self-effectuating control;
many things are not done by corporate managements which would be
done if they could be done without disclosure. But the requirement
of disclosure gains strength from the sanctions available to those to
whom the information is disclosed. Perhaps the most important sanc-
tion is the derivative suit to recover for the corporation the fruits of
a manager's breach of his duty. Another is the threat that the man-
agement will be deposed by an insurgent if its performance does not
measure up to the expected standards.
The first sanction is only effective where a legal standard has been
violated; it does not reach any other "wrong" decisions. Where control
of the corporation rests on a basis of one or a few large shareholdings,
the second sanction is missing. The management supported by the
holder of a majority, or near-majority, of the outstanding voting shares
cannot be deposed no matter how far its performance falls below the
standards expected by the other shareholders.
What justification is there for giving the man with thirty percent,
or fifty-one percent, or even ninety-nine percent, of the voting shares,
absolute power to choose the management that controls the corporation's
affairs? If there is justification, it should be found either in the inter-
ests of the shareholders or in important interests relating to the alloca-
tion of resources in our society.
First, the interest of the controlling shareholder himself: his in-
terest, as a shareholder, is presumably in seeing that the corporation
is run to achieve maximum benefit for the shareholders, including
sue of management compensation, one study has concluded that companies not subject
to control by large shareholders or by financial interests tend to give higher rewards to
management than companies in which those controls are present. Washington, The Cor-
porate Executive's Living Wage, 54 HAv. L. Rnv. 733, 761 (1941), discussed in 2 G.
WASHINGTON & V. RoTnsCHiLD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 926 (3d ed.
1962). See also J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMEmcAN STOCKHOLDiR 226, 229 (1958). The presence of
"outside" (i.e., non-officer) directors on the board, however, does not seem to act as a
control on management compensation according to another study which found that
median salaries of executives of companies with a majority of outside directors were higher
than those in comparable companies in which a majority of the directors were also
executives of the company. M. NEwcom, Tm BIG BUSINESS ExEcurvE 128 (1955).
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himself. If he has thirty percent of the shares, and the remaining share-
holders seventy percent, his total stake in the corporation is less than
half as great as theirs. In this situation, it is hard to argue that taking
away his right to choose the management would be an unfair depriva-
tion. But what if he has fifty-one percent, and the remaining share-
holders forty-nine percent? Here his stake is not only larger than that
of any other single shareholder, but, in one sense, larger than all the
others put together. He would argue that it is inequitable to permit
those with a smaller aggregate stake in the corporation to override his
views, simply because their holdings are scattered and his are concen-
trated.
There is undoubtedly surface appeal to the argument that logical
application to business corporations of the putative common law rule
of one vote per member will give to shareholders a vote for each share.
Unfortunately, there is little more than that. Policy may argue for such
a result, but logic cannot command it unless we accept the further
proposition that the directors represent the shares rather than the
shareholders. The members of a non-business corporation or other in-
stitutional constituency do not have equal votes because their interests
are "equal." Their respective interests may be very different, and in-
terests cannot be measured in the same way that votes are. They are
accorded equality in voting under the fundamental principle that votes
are decisions, decisions are made by people, and one person's decision
should not be given greater weight than another's unless some impor-
tant reason of policy supports the distinction."5 In business corpora-
tions, a method of allocating interests in profit and loss happens to
have an analogue in voting procedure that has the twin advantages of
being simple and precise in application and being congenial to the in-
terests of those who set up such corporations. It is inherently no more
logical than making voting rights in school district elections propor-
tional to the school taxes paid by the voters or the numbers of their
children enrolled in the school system.""
The situation of the shareholder who has ninety-nine percent of
the outstanding shares differs only in degree from the preceding ex-
ample. However, where the percentage of shares held by the scattered
shareholders falls below a certain point-which could be five percent
or ten percent-there should obviously be a method by which the ma-
jor shareholder could convert the corporation from public to private
85 See text accompanying notes 139-156 infra.
86 See text accompanying notes 148-156 infra.
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status and buy out the interests of the scattered shareholders subject to
procedural safeguards like those now used in appraisal proceedings.8 7
The second interest that may be thought to justify control by the
large shareholder is the interest of the scattered shareholders them-
selves. This could rest on either (or both) of two theories.
First, because the large shareholder has a large investment, he
will devote more time and care to it, and his judgment as to what will
most benefit all the shareholders will be better than the collective, but
uncollected, wisdom of his scattered brethren. It is hard to know how
much weight to give to this argument. The large shareholder will
almost certainly have better access to information about how the com-
pany is being managed, but unfortunately there are many opportu-
nities and incentives for him to use that information for his own
personal advantage rather than for the common benefit of all the share-
holders or of all the people interested in the company's operation.
The number of cases in which large shareholders are alleged to have
breached their "fiduciary duty" to the other shareholders indicates
that this "safeguard" may be similar to putting the lions in the same
cage with the rabbits at the zoo, on the assumption that the lions will
represent the rabbits' interests in negotiating with the keepers for food.
Second, the single large shareholder can exercise more effective
control over the management. No question about it: it is doubtful
whether the control exercised by a scattered shareholder electorate
through the use of its votes is even worthy of the name "control," while
the single large shareholder often can, and does, closely supervise the
actions of the elected management (if he is not himself the chief ex-
ecutive officer). The question is whether the control he exercises is
more responsive to the welfare of the scattered shareholders than the
self-control of the management itself. To the extent that the large
shareholder views himself as the trustee of the business and the em-
ployer of its management, and has no substantial financial or other
interests in other firms that might affect his view of the corporation's
affairs, the ideal may be fulfilled. However, by the nature of the beast,
there is a much greater likelihood that the single large shareholder,
with more spare money and spare time than the salaried management
of the corporation, will have substantial interests in other businesses
87 The conversion can be effected without even a vote of shareholders in many states
by use of a "short-form" merger. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (Supp. 1968); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAw § 905 (McKinney 1963). Occasionally a large publicly-held company is
restored to private ownership, as was the George A. Fuller Company in 1965. N.Y. Times,
June 8, 1965, at 59, col. 3.
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than that the salaried managers will have such interests. Also, to the
extent that he is less involved than the salaried managers in the run-
ning of the corporation's business, he may have a lesser sense of iden-
tification with the corporation as an entity and a consequently greater
inclination to view the corporation as a means of achieving objects
unrelated to the interests of the shareholders and the corporation's
other constituencies. s8 On balance, the scattered shareholders are likely
to have a more faithful agent in the salaried management than in the
large shareholder, despite the superficial identity of interest that they
have with the latter. Furthermore, it is much easier to police the ac-
tions of the official managers of the business than those of the control-
ling shareholder, who may operate in an unofficial and indirect man-
ner in achieving his objectives.
The public policy argument for favoring large shareholder control
is that the large shareholder is likely to be closer to the classical eco-
nomic ideal of the innovative entrepreneur, who through his selfish
efforts will produce a more efficient allocation of productive assets and
thereby benefit the entire society. The trouble with this theory, as Gal-
braith has pointed out, is that for those companies which have ceased
to be "Entrepreneurial Corporations" and have become "Mature Cor-
porations" (which includes most of our largest enterprises), the entre-
preneurial techniques suited to new, small, single-product businesses
simply will not work. 9 When such techniques are actually continued,
they may lead to the financial ruin of the company.90 More often, the
"entrepreneurial" image cultivated by the Mature Corporation merely
serves as window dressing for sophisticated financial manipulations,
such as those that characterized the "conglomerate" developments of
the past decade.
B. Take-Over Bids and the Rise of the Conglomerate
The problems of sale of control, by their nature, can arise only in
corporations in which a "controlling block" of shares already exists.
The development of the "conglomerate" corporation and the use of
one of its principal techniques, the "take-over bid," however, indicate
88 Section I infra.
89 J. GALBRAiTH, TnE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 92 (1967).
90 Id. at 88-92. Among Galbraith's examples of entrepreneurs who carried on in the
"entrepreneurial" manner after it had become counter-productive are Henry Ford,
Sewell Avery of Montgomery Ward, and Howard Hughes of TWA. The most recent
notorious example is Bernie Cornfeld of IOS. See Ball, Bernie Cornfeld: The Salesman
Who Believed Himself, FoRTutr , Sept. 1970, at 136.
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that there is a similar problem, at least in latent form, for any publicly-
held company.
The conglomerate corporation is one that grows by acquiring
other companies in related or unrelated lines of business. These acqui-
sitions are sometimes made with the concurrence of the acquired com-
pany's management but in other cases are made by means of a pub-
lished tender offer for the publicly-owned stock of the company to be
acquired, either in exchange for securities of the acquiring conglom-
erate or for cash it has accumulated or borrowed.
The situation here is the same as that involved in the sale of con-
trol to the extent that control of the corporation is shifted to a new
person or group acquiring a substantial part of the corporation's vot-
ing shares. The significant difference, however, is that the initiative in
the take-over bid comes from outside the corporation, and the shift
of control is often accomplished by paying a premium above market
price for the interests of the scattered shareholders rather than those
of the incumbent management. The result, in many cases, is simply
the unceremonious ousting of the old management without any com-
pensation whatsoever.
As might be imagined, the cries of outrage over this form of trans-
fer of control came not from the scholars but from the managers. (The
scholars, in fact, were quite taken with the whole development as a
means of securing a more efficient utilization of capital assets.) 91 The
managers ran to Congress and the state legislatures for protection
against the "pirates" who were raiding "fine old companies" and re-
ceived a rather mixed reception. From Congress, which has generally
limited itself to disclosure requirements in regulating management-
shareholder relations in industrial companies, they got the Williams
Bill,92 which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to apply to
contested take-over bids the same kind of filing and disclosure require-
ments that were already applicable to proxy contests. In Ohio93 and
Virginia,9 they secured the passage of laws giving state agencies sup-
plementary authority over disclosure and other practices in tender
offers. In other states, such as Illinois"5 and Pennsylvania,96 they were
unsuccessful in putting through broader laws authorizing state agen-
91 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 53-67, 114-45 (1967).
92 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1)-(e)(2), 78n(d)(1)-(f) (Supp. IV, 1969).
93 Orno REv. CoDE ANN. § 1707.04.1 (Page Supp. 1970).
94 VA. CoDE ANN. § 13.1-528 (Supp. 1970).
95 See BNA SEc. Rac. & L. RaP. No. 5, at A-9 (July 2, 1969).
96 Pa. H.R. 841, 1969 Sess.
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cies to approve or disapprove the acquisition of a controlling block
of a company's shares after considering the general interest of share-
holders, employees, and affected communities. The academic opposi-
tion of the economists was combined in these cases with the more
selfishly-motivated (and more effective) opposition of the investment
bankers, who make substantial amounts of money out of the activities
surrounding take-over bids.9 7
A second major defense of the threatened managers was to amend
their corporate charters in a variety of ways to make it more difficult
for a raider who acquired a substantial block of their shares to merge
the target company into his own. One company, for example, proposed
to require the approval of the holders of two-thirds of the shares not
held by the raider, as well as the holders of two-thirds of all the shares,
for any such merger.98 The most interesting thing about this line of
defense was the reaction of the New York Stock Exchange, on which
many of the principal target companies were listed. The Exchange
saw these defensive tactics as a threat to its concepts of "corporate
democracy .... which would in effect discriminate between shareholders
based on the size of their investment."99 In other words, "corporate
democracy" means "one share, one vote," and any departure from
that rule is "undemocratic." As a result of strong protests from the
management of many listed companies against any implementation
of the Exchange's "democratic" principles, "the Board of Governors
of the Exchange indicated a deep concern with the problems in this
area but determined not to adopt a formal policy at this time."'100
The significance of the rise of the take-over bid, and the manage-
rial response to it, insofar as it relates to allocation of corporate voting
rights, is that it showed that any company, no matter how large or
how widely scattered its shareholdings, was subject to being brought
97 See Hearing Before Pennsylvania House Comm. on Business and Commerce in re
House Bill 841, 1969 Sess.
98 Letter from NYSE to Presidents of Listed Companies, Dec. 26, 1968, in NYSE,
ComPANY MANUAL, at xxi (1969).
99 Id. The American Stock Exchange, two years earlier, had informed a Canadian
company that a provision of its by-laws limiting any shareholder to 1,000 votes was "not
consistent with the Exchange's policy with respect to voting rights...." and might lead to
delisting. The company had stated that the by-law "ensures among other things that any
'take-over' offers for the Company would be made openly to the Company or to all the
shareholders, rather than to the owners of large blocks of stock in undisclosed transac-
tions." Prospectus of Canada Southern Petroleum Ltd. 19 (July 7, 1966). The company
still has the restriction on voting rights, but is no longer listed on the American Stock
Exchange. MOODy'S INDUSRIAL MANUAL 3143 (1969).
100 Letter from NYSE to Presidents of Listed Companies, Feb. 21, 1969, in NYSE,
ComPANY M.ANUAL, at xxiii (1969). See Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1969, at 6, col. 2.
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quickly under the control of almost any "entrepreneur" who really
wanted to take it over. Many take-overs were motivated, at least in
part, by the availability to the acquiring company of substantial re-
tained earnings in the form of liquid assets which the tax law dis-
couraged it from distributing to its shareholders or investing in
income-producing securities. However, as many enterprising conglom-
erateurs' 01 showed, no substantial assets (other than stock selling at a
high multiple of earnings) were needed to "buy" a large publicly-
held company. Little companies could, and did, swallow much larger
ones by the simple expedients of issuing their own convertible deben-
tures in exchange for the shares they wanted to acquire, or borrowing
from banks the money needed to buy the shares and pledging the ac-
quired shares as collateral. 102
Whether these take-over artists were pirates out to loot fine old
companies, as the ousted or threatened managers charged, or enter-
prising capitalists ousting tired old managements to secure a more
efficient use of capital, as they themselves asserted, is hard to deter-
mine. The current shakeout of the conglomerates indicates that in
most cases they were neither, but rather were enterprising individuals
who took advantage of a "performance" fad and flabby accounting
rules to create an appearance of growth by putting together companies
whose financial statements looked good together, whether or not their
operations fit well together.
Despite the misgivings of many thoughtful people concerning
the economic, social, and political consequences of the conglomerates,
the managers of target companies were unable to put together any
satisfactory rationale for imposing legal restrictions on take-over ac-
tivities. According to conventional wisdom, if a person or company
was willing to make a tender offer at fifty dollars a share for stock that
was selling in the market for forty dollars a share, he presumptively
had plans for utilizing the company's assets in a way that would make
101 This may be considered an unduly elegant way of referring to someone who puts
companies together. Ogden Nash, commenting on a news story about the marriage of the
Marquesa de Portago to "Richard C. Pistell, the conglomerateur," expresses the hope
"that every oilateur and shipping magnateur and scrap-metalateur,/indeed every ty-
coonateur, will soon have a Marquesa of their/own." He notes in conclusion, however,
that "to eur is human, isn' it?" Nash, Who, Sir? Me, Sir? No, Sir, The Times, Sir!,
ATLANTc MONTHLY, June 1970, at 66.
102 One analyst even felt that General Motors, because of its "underleveraged" finan-
cial structure, would be an "ideal target" for a conglomerateur able to print up "$15
billion worth of debentures and maybe another $10 billion in stock and warrants" to
offer in exchange for GM's shares. Burck, The Merger Movement Rides High, FORTUNE,
Feb. 1969, at 79, 161.
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them worth more than the value the "market" was now assigning to
them; that is, he would have to provide better management to justify
his own investment. The managers could not claim any vested right
in themselves to continue to control the company, for the conventional
theory was that they were the mere hirelings of the "owners" of the
company-its shareholders. Hence, their only argument to justify state
interference was that the threatened take-over would harm the inter-
ests of some group the state had an obligation to protect. This could
hardly be the shareholders, the "owners" who were being offered fifty
dollars for shares that were worth only forty dollars in the market. It
must, therefore, be other groups, such as employees, suppliers, or cus-
tomers, or the economic interest of the people of the state as a whole.
Thus, under rather unlikely auspices, arising from unusual cir-
cumstances, the state was importuned to make corporate management
responsive to a broader constituency in directing the corporation's
business affairs. Though tempted, the state by and large did not re-
spond.103
C. Institutional Investors
At the same time that conglomerate adventurers were busy re-
storing publicly-held companies to single ownership-sometimes by
private individuals or groups but more often as subsidiaries of other
companies-another group of investors, with entirely different pur-
poses and different techniques, had been buying up even larger num-
bers of shares that were in "public" hands. This group is composed
of the so-called "institutional investors," most notably the mutual
funds, insurance companies, and pension funds, which are becoming
(if they have not already become) the principal vehicle for "public"
investment in common stocks.
The banks, which are still the largest institutional investors, have,
of course, been in this business for decades. Their holdings of common
stock, however, have been largely in individual accounts, held in trust
or similar capacity, and voting of the shares may be subject to different
procedures or consents in each of the separate accounts. The distinc-
tive features of the newer breed of institutional investors is that their
decisions-on investment, voting of shares, and everything else-are
103 The activities of the conglomerates have been sharply curtailed, at least tem-
porarily, by a sharp drop in the market price of their securities and by indirect restric-
tions on their issuance of convertible securities through changes in the tax laws and in
stock exchange listing standards. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 279, added by Tax Reform
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 411(a) (Dec. 80, 1969); Letter from NYSE to Presidents
of Listed Companies, supra note 100.
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made by a small group of managers on behalf of scattered beneficiaries,
the great majority of whom have no idea what shares their institution
owns, let alone how those shares are being or should be voted.
Unlike the conglomerate-builders, who buy shares largely to amass
enough of the votes that are attached to them to take control of the
company's assets, the institutional investors generally want shares only
for the possibility of profit or return. They do not really want the
votes, which require them to make decisions for which they do not
wish to be held responsible.
The divergence of objectives between conglomerates and institu-
tions has led to some rather unattractive symbiotic relationships. The
conglomerate may interest an institution in buying up shares of the
target company at the current market price, with the expectation that
the institution will then tender its shares to the conglomerate in a
subsequent tender offer at a higher price, or that it will vote its shares
in favor of a subsequent merger and cash them in for the higher valued
package of securities of the attacking company. In either case, the con-
glomerate gets the votes and the institution gets the profit by selling
the votes, which it has no desire to use for itself.104
Far more serious than these ad hoc special relationships is the
general problem created by lodging the power and responsibility for
the selection and legitimation of corporate management in the hands
of people who have disclaimed any interest in the election decision.
The standard line of the institutional manager is: "We vote with the
management. If we don't like the management, we sell the stock."
Since institutions now own about one-quarter of the shares of the com-
panies listed on the New York Stock Exchange,105 this attitude creates
a rather large vacuum in the corporate election process. 106
But what if the job of voting portfolio securities held by institu-
tions is taken away from the functionaries to whom it is now generally
delegated and exercised directly by the directors and top officers of
the institutions? Some commentators have seen this possibility as the
best hope of providing an independent check on the actions of corpo-
rate managers. 0 7
104 See, e.g., SEC v. Talley Indus., Inc., 399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 593 U.S.
1015 (1968). The Chairman of the SEC has indicated in congressional testimony that the
practice may be widespread. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1970, at 51, col. 7.
105 NYSE, 1969 FAar BooK 45.
108 There are, of course, many individual investors whose views are identical to those
ascribed to institutional managers. The difference is that the individual investor is
normally not subject to any fiduciary obligation that prevents (or that he believes
prevents) his taking a more active role in the selection process.
107 See A. BEaa., ECONOMIC POWE R AMD Tim FRxE SocamY 12-13 (1958); Rostow, To
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There are at least two problems here. First, the people who ac-
tually manage the institutions have shown no more inclination to
take the time or trouble to improve corporate management than have
their hirelings; if they don't like the management, they will sell (un-
less they have word that an attractive tender offer or merger proposal
is coming). Second, and more important, many of the directors of the
institutions are also officers or directors of the companies in which
the institutions invest. Although they would presumably disqualify
themselves from participating in the institution's evaluation of the
companies with which they are personally involved, they can hardly
be unaware of the reciprocal impact of such intervention. If Mr. Smith,
as a director of Fund A, undertakes to evaluate the management of X
Corporation, in which Fund A has a substantial interest, he does so
with the realization that Mr. Jones, who is the President of X Cor-
poration, can, as a director of Fund B, undertake a similar evaluation
of the management of Y Corporation, in which Fund B has a sub-
stantial interest and of which Mr. Smith is President. It is not too
pleasant to contemplate one part of the business establishment sitting
in judgment on another part of the same establishment, with the
knowledge that their roles may be reversed in a similar future situa-
tion. 0s
D. Campaign GM
The development of conglomerates and the rise of institutional
investors each involve a process of "reconcentration," in which pre-
viously scattered shareholdings are brought together to be managed
and voted as a block. Perhaps neither of these two developments
standing alone, or even together, would place any significant new strain
on the rules governing corporate elections were it not for a third
development which has changed the nature, not of the electorate,
but of the questions to be decided.
If an electorate is not presented with any significant policy ques-
tions, it does not matter too much who comprises the electorate or
what motivates their decisions. As long as it was assumed that the sole
test of the performance of corporate management was the amount of
money they made "for the shareholders," one man's (or institution's)
view of his economic self-interest was pretty much like another's. 109
Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CoRmoRAToN
IN MoDEnN SociEpy 46, 55 (E. Mason ed. 1961).
108 See Rostow, supra note 107.
109 Opinions may differ, of course, about the best way to achieve optimum per-
formance, but the issues to be resolved are usually so complex as to defy rational parti-
cipation by a substantial electorate. For example, the proxy statements that publicly-held
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If the management's economic performance is bad, they have to face
the possibility that they will be ousted. Since the shareholders are vot-
ing only their selfish economic interest, there is nothing wrong with
their buying and selling votes (through the medium of purchases and
sales of shares) or with one man buying up enough votes to kick the
incumbent management out and try his own ideas on how to make
more money (if that is the real objective of his take-over).
Since the rise of the modem publicly-held business corporation,
two limitations have been recognized on the type of issues that could
be brought before the shareholder electorate for decision or ratifica-
tion (and, by implication, on the type of issues they could consider in
voting on nominees for the board of directors). First, the issue could
not be so narrow as to constitute an interference with the directors'
(i.e., management's) right and obligation to manage the day-to-day
affairs of the company. Second, the issue could not be so broad that
it could be said to relate primarily to "general economic, political,
racial, religious, social or similar causes" rather than to the self-in-
terest of the shareholders as economic animals. 10
What reasons underlie this dual limitation which has put a severe
squeeze on the range of issues that can be put to a shareholder vote?
Management can presumably justify the first limitation on the ground
that shareholder meetings are an intolerably clumsy instrument for
making frequent and detailed administrative decisions. It can be ques-
tioned whether there is any real danger of shareholder intervention in
this direction, but in any event the limitation is not a serious one.
Egregious cases of unfairness or impropriety by management certainly
deserve and require scrutiny by the shareholders, but this can prob-
ably be better achieved by the judicial proceeding of a derivative suit
(the game of Corporations II) than by the legislative activity of the
shareholders at a meeting.
The justification for the second limitation rests on somewhat
different footing. One would expect management to argue that share-
holders should not vote on "general economic, political, racial, reli-
gious, social or similar" issues because those are outside the scope of
the corporation's concerns and are matters on which management
should take no stand. In fact, management's current position seems
companies are required to furnish to their shareholders when soliciting votes on a
proposed merger are considered by experts to be the most useful source for appraising
the company's financial prospects. Yet their complexity and length (often running to 100
pages or more) make them incomprehensible to all but the most sophisticated share-
holders.
110 SEC rules 14a-8(c)(2), (5), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-8(c)(2), (5) (1970).
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to be quite different. In response to the recent proxy solicitation by
a group calling itself the Campaign to Make General Motors Re-
sponsible (Campaign GM) in favor of changes in the General Motors
management structure, "designed to make the Corporation more re-
sponsible to the community as a whole,""' management did not argue
that it had no such responsibilities but instead distributed to its
shareholders a twenty-one page defense of how well it was fulfilling
them.112 To be sure, the GM management did emphasize its "basic
obligation" to "pay dividends to its stockholders." 113 However, it
seemed to view this as its intermediate rather than its ultimate goal,
stating that "a corporation's ability to fulfill its other responsibilities
depends upon how successful it is in achieving a profit."114
By taking this position, the GM management appeared, at least,
to be more concerned with the public responsibilities of an automobile
manufacturer than is the management of Yale University. Yale, like
Harvard, decided to abstain from casting its 25,000 votes on the Cam-
paign GM proposals "on the principle that the Fellows of the [Yale]
corporation do not and should not have the power to take a corporate
position on issues of a political or social nature which do not directly
affect the university in its relations with the local community.""n5 In
other words, the universities, along with the other institutional in-
vestors that are amassing an increasing proportion of the voting shares
of major industrial companies, do not want the votes that come with
these shares if it requires them to do anything other than make a
decision on how best to increase their investment return to meet
their pressing financial needs. This institutional "cop-out" raises some
serious questions.
Campaign GM broke new ground by persuading the Securities
and Exchange Commission, over GM's vigorous opposition, that at
least two of its proposals were proper subjects for shareholder consid-
eration."0 Since then, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia has ordered the SEC to reconsider its rejection of the attempt by
a group of shareholders of Dow Chemical Company to force a share-
holder vote on whether the company should continue to manufacture
Ill Proxy Statement of Campaign GM 2 (March 25, 1970).
112 General Motors Corp., GM's Record of Progress (1970).
113 Id. at 20.
114 Id. See also note 118 infra.
115 N.Y. Times, May 11, 1970, at 27, col. 1.
116 Wall St. J., April 7, 1970, at 40, col 2.
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napalm." 7 The court ruled that shareholders have the right to be in-
volved in corporate decisions that have social impact and that they
must be given an opportunity to vote on these matters at shareholders'
meetings.118 Future campaigners should have less difficulty in tailor-
ing their proposals to the liberalized SEC standards and bringing more
economic and social issues into corporate meetings.
Senator Muskie has introduced a bill entitled the "Corporate
Participation Act," which would bar the SEC from excluding a stock-
holder proposal "on the ground that such proposal may involve eco-
nomic, political, racial, religious or similar issues, unless the matter
or action proposed is not within the control of the issuer."" 9 The bill
is designed, in his words, "to allow shareholders to place on the com-
pany ballot any proposal which promotes economic, or social causes
related to the business of the corporation."' 20 He indicated that his
proposed bill was a consequence of the inadequate results of Campaign
GM,121 and it would indeed have ensured that all of the proposals
made by that group would have been brought to the floor of the meet-
ing.
The Muskie proposal, however, would have no direct effect on
the reception accorded proposals of the Campaign GM type when
they reached the floor. Although the Campaign leaders had hoped to
derive their principal support from public-spirited institutional man-
agers holding large blocks of shares, their principal support, in fact,
came from the smaller shareholders. Their two proposals, for the es-
tablishment of a Committee on Corporate Responsibility and for the
addition to the board of three "public-interest" directors, received the
support of 7.19 percent and 6.22 percent, respectively, of the share-
holders, but only 2.73 percent and 2.44 percent, respectively, of the
shares voted.122 The shareholders who voted for the Campaign GM
117 Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 59,
at D-1 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 1970).
118 The Dow management's position was weakened by their having been
repeatedly quoted in sources which include the company's own publications as
proclaiming that the decision to continue manufacturing and marketing napalm
was made not because of business considerations, but in spite of them; that man-
agement in essence decided to pursue a course of activity which generated
little profit for the shareholders and actively impaired the company's public
relations and recruitment activities because management considered this action
morally and politically desirable.
Id. at D-11 (emphasis in original).
19 S. 4003, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
120 116 CONG. REc. S 9568 (daily ed. June 23, 1970); N.Y. Times, June 23, 1970, at 59,
col. 2.
121 116 CONG. Rac. S 9568 (daily ed. June 23, 1970).
122 Wall St. J., May 25, 1970, at 4, col. 3.
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proposals owned an average of 103 shares as against an average of 284
shares for those who voted against the proposals and an average of 210
shares for all GM shareholders.12
While neither proposal came close to achieving a majority, no
matter how the vote is sliced, the indication is that on a vote of this
nature the result may differ sharply depending on whether one is
counting shares or voters. Of course, the vote of an institutional in-
vestor may itself reflect a division among its managers. College Retire-
ment Equities Fund (CREF), a pension fund for university professors,
cast 608,700 votes against the Campaign GM proposal to add public-
interest directors to the GM board on the basis of a nine-to-seven vote
against the proposal in its own board of trustees. 24 Thus, on that vote,
the individual decisions of two members of an institutional board
offset the individual decisions of approximately 6,000 other GM share-
holders.125
III
MANAGEMENT AND ITS CONSTITUENCIES
In the spring of 1982, a debate was conducted in the pages of the
Harvard Law Review on the question: "For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?" Professor E. Merrick Dodd postulated that cor-
porate managers owed duties to employees, consumers, and the general
public, as well as to shareholders.126 Mr. A. A. Berle, on the other hand,
considered it unwise to depart from the view that corporate managers
should act solely for the purpose of making profits for the shareholders
"until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably
enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else.' 127 It is now
123 These calculations are based on data in MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 2278, 2281
(1969).
124 Letter from William C. Greenough, Chairman of CREF, to James M. Roche,
Chairman of GM, May 13, 1970.
125 Dr. Roger Murray of CREF is quite concerned about the situation:
The people who have control over the stock have a great deal of power that
no one ever really gave them. They speak, not with their own voices, but with
the voice of the size of their stock. Do you really think that your counterpart at
Metropolitan Life ought to be seven times as influential as you are because he
has seven times more stock?
Landau, Do Institutional Investors Have a Social Responsibility?, INsTrrUTONAL INvEsTOR,
July 1970, at 25, 87. His only suggestion, however, is that "it should be seven times more
difficult for Metropolitan Life to take a stand." Id.
126 Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. Rnv. 1145, 1156
(1932).




popularly supposed that Professor Dodd had the better of the argu-
ment; indeed, Mr. Berle himself has since conceded that "the argument
has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of
Professor Dodd's contention,"'128 and that "modem directors are not
limited to running business enterprise for maximum profit, but are
in fact and recognized in law as administrators of a community sys-
tem." 129
My concern here is not with whether Dodd or Berle was right; in
fact, while corporate management today may prefer to quote the
former than the latter, its actual motivation is probably closer to Gal-
braith's formulation of "a secure minimum of earnings" which is
necessary to "preserve the .autonomy on which its decision-making
power depends."'130 My purpose is rather to question whether the
present system of "one share, one vote" is a desirable method of select-
ing (or ratifying the selection of) corporate managers under either of
the alternative formulations of their fiduciary obligation. At first
glance, it would seem that if there is to be an electorate, it should
include all the groups to which the management owes responsibility.
If Professor Dodd was right, this should include employees, consumers,
and the general public, as well as shareholders.' 13 However, the deter-
mination of the boundaries of these other groups raises serious diffi-
culties.
Employees would not be too difficult a group to delimit. They
could be given voting power in either of two ways: the German sys-
tem, under which they vote separately for "labor directors," or a system
under which they would vote along with shareholders for a single
slate of directors.
Consumers present a different problem. In the case of a large
manufacturing concern, "consumers" may include the wholesalers
and retailers who distribute the corporation's products, as well as the
ultimate consumers. Not only are the interests of these two groups
divergent in many respects, but expansion of the electorate to the
latter group would, in the case of some corporations, extend the fran-
chise almost without limit. If every person who had ever purchased
128 A. BERLE, TnE TwENTiE CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954).
129 Berle, Foreword to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 107, at xii.
130 J. GALBRAITH, supra note 89, at 167-68.
131 In fact, we might first question whether shareholders should be included at all.
Chayes maintains, not without justification, that "of all those standing in relation to the
large corporation, the shareholder is least subject to its power." Chayes, The Modern
Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SocIETY, supra note
107, at 25, 40.
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a General Electric light bulb had a right to participate in choosing
the directors, the corporation would be forced to say that anyone in
the world who wants to vote at a GE election can do so. This is ab-
surd, but absurd only because it is unworkable. The purchasers of GE
light bulbs, as a group, have a real and substantial interest in whether
GE management incorporates known improvements in the product.
The problem is finding the most appropriate means by which this in-
terest can be taken into account in management decisions. To say that
the customers' only right is to buy the goods of a competing manufac-
turer is akin to saying that a shareholder does not need a vote in a
publicly-held corporation because he is fully protected by his right to
sell his shares on the market at any time. The light bulb users have
an interest, and they have a right to have it considered by the manage-
ment; the real question is the procedure, if any, by which they should
be able to express their dissatisfaction.
If consumers are indeterminate, the general public is virtually
indefinable. The inhabitants of areas around the corporation's plants
are certainly part of it, but how large an area? And what of communities
all along the river into which the wastes from the corporation's plants
are discharged, or communities around the plants of the corporation's
suppliers?
This brief catalogue is enough to show that an electorate-if
there should be an electorate--cannot be defined by the groups to
whom managers are said to have responsibility. Yet if we expect man-
agers to act in the interest of their various constituencies, we must
give them some incentive to do so. The pluses and minuses of their
stewardship should be subject to genuine debate at the time they seek
re-election or when a particular action requires ratification by their
constituents. We cannot expect them to continue indefinitely to aim
for higher levels of "statesmanship" in the management of the institu-
tions for which they are responsible if we continue at the same time
to structure the electorate so that it will perforce be guided only by
the most selfish and limited economic interests in casting its votes.
The absence of workable alternatives forces us to return to the
concept of the shareholders as the electorate. The system has shown
that it works, and perhaps some modification could make it an effec-
tive instrument for the conduct of a plebiscite.
The difficulty with the system of "one share, one vote" as it
applies to the publicly-held corporation is that it makes it virtually
impossible for any constituency, no matter how large, to make any
impression in the vote for directors unless its members have an enor-
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mous amount of money available to buy shares. Take General Motors
Corporation (admittedly an extreme example, but an important one).
GM has 285 million shares outstanding with a current market value
of about twenty billion dollars.132 Assume that a sizable group of GM's
customers, or dealers, or employees decide that the GM management
is not giving adequate weight to their interests. To acquire a majority
of the outstanding shares would cost them about ten billion dollars.
To acquire a thirty-percent interest which might give them "working
control" would cost about six billion dollars. The money required
to achieve any sort of voice in management would be totally beyond
their capabilities, if not their imagination. In the period 1964-68, GM
produced approximately 22,000,000 passenger cars. Assuming that is
a rough measure of the number of current owners of GM cars, it
would require an investment of almost $500 by each of them to ac-
quire a majority of GM's outstanding shares. For the 750,000 em-
ployees, an investment of more than $13,000 per capita would be
required. 133
Contrast the situation that would exist if each GM shareholder
had one vote. GM presently has about 1,400,000 shareholders. 134 Even
assuming none of the present shareholders is an employee, an invest-
ment of sixty-five dollars by each of the employees (the approximate
price of one share) would give them more than one-third of the votes,
assuming, that is, that other interested groups did not start buying
GM shares to ensure proper consideration of their interests. The cus-
tomers, of course, could obtain a majority of the votes even if only
one-tenth of them bought one share each. The dealers and suppliers
and their employees would have a similar, if smaller, potential.
Of course, there is no assurance that the employees, or the cus-
tomers, or the dealers would make any effort to gain control of GM
or any other corporation, or that those who did buy would exercise
their voting rights with more thought to their status as employees,
or users, or some other capacity than to their interests as shareholders
in increasing the profits of the corporation. The important point is
that the potential would be there. The management would have to
132 MooDy's INDUsTnAL MANUAL 2278 (1969).
133 The situation in the Ford Motor Company is even worse. When Ford went public
in 1956, the Ford family retained a special class of common stock that entitles it to
40% of the votes at any shareholders' meeting, even though it currently represents only
about 15% of the equity interest in the company. The New York Stock Exchange sanc-
tioned this departure from its concepts of "corporate democracy" in order to have Ford
stock listed on the Big Board. See J. LrVINGSroN, supra note 84, at 166-77.
134 MOODY's INDUSTIUAL MANUAL 2281 (1969).
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recognize that if it failed significantly in its responsibilities to any
one of its major constituencies, that constituency would have a rea-
sonable chance to muster the votes to turn it out of office. The in-
cumbents would still have the important advantages that they now
have in control of the corporate procedures, but that is as it should
be. The burden should be on those who argue for change to prove
their point to a sufficient proportion of the electorate to overcome the
inertia that characterizes the bulk of the members of any electorate.
But now suppose that Mr. Berle has really been closer to the
truth all along than Professor Dodd, and that we have not yet defined
clearly enough management's responsibilities to its other constituen-
cies to cut it adrift from the guidance of the profit motive and the
benefit of the shareholders.
In the section on "Sales of Control" above, I have questioned
whether giving the single large shareholder power to override or ig-
nore the views of large numbers of small shareholders best serves the
interests of the shareholders as a group, even when those interests are
viewed in the narrow economic sense. My question here is whether
the authority given to the managers to represent shareholder interests
on a "one share, one vote" basis can still be justified by the argument
that corporate managers are ill-suited, by training or temperament,
to the job of balancing the social and economic interests of diverse
groups, and should therefore be limited to doing what they are trained
and know how to do-make a profit.
Under the original Berle formulation, it is not management's
job to take account of the interests of employees, consumers, or the
general public except when it takes those interests into account as a
tactical measure to secure the favor, or avert the opposition, of those
groups and thus to further its ultimate goal of profit. In this view,
management in effect acts as bargaining agent for itself and the share-
holders in negotiating with the other interest groups. It is an appeal-
ing viewpoint, but if it is to facilitate an optimum balance among the
different interest groups, there must be real arm's-length bargaining
between management and the representatives of the interest groups
other than shareholders.
The ideal is probably most nearly achieved in the case of the em-
ployees; in fact, in some industries, the balance of bargaining power
has tipped strongly in favor of the employees vis-&-vis corporate man-
agement. Under current labor laws, there is a good deal of bona fide
arm's-length bargaining between management and labor representa-
tives over real questions of allocation of economic benefits and deci-
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sion-making power within the corporate organization. 135 The principal
weakness in the system as it presently operates is that no interests
other than labor, management, and the shareholders are effectively
represented, and it is quite possible, and indeed common, for the
negotiations to result in an agreement that satisfies both employees
and management at the expense of consumers or other unrepresented
economic or social interest groups.
The situation regarding consumers is somewhat more complex.
It is fashionable among corporate public relations men to picture the
consumer as "king" and the manufacturer as a humble supplicant
begging his favor to assure its economic survival. The example of the
Edsel is usually trotted out to show that even the largest and most
powerful corporations have only limited power to manipulate the pub-
lic taste. The weakness of this argument lies in the nature of the choice
presented to the customer and the circumstances under which he must
make his decision. Unlike the employee situation, there is no regular,
formalized arm's-length bargaining between management and cus-
tomer representatives to determine what products will be offered at
what prices; management determines what products will bring it the
greatest return on the use of its capital facilities and then bends its
efforts, through advertising and other techniques, to secure their maxi-
mum acceptance. To the extent that new products represent responses
to expressed customer preferences or measurable improvements in
quality or reductions in cost, the system can be said to be working.
But the distressingly high percentage of cases in which new product
development represents none of these is sufficient indication that the
interests of consumers, as distinguished from the psychology of con-
sumers, are not given effective weight in corporate managerial deci-
sions.13 6
The representation of "community" interests vis-4-vis those of
management and shareholders suffers from a somewhat different kind
of weakness-one which Alfred Kahn has referred to as the "tyranny
of small decisions.'1 37 The issues on which the management-share-
holder interest and the community interest might be expected to
135 See Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in THE CoRPORATON IN
MODERN SocIETY, supra note 107, at 218, 227.
136 "A consumer veto over wasteful use of resources after the use has been made is by
no means the same as consumer control over their use." Means, Collective Capitalism and
Economic Theory, in THE CoRoRA-noN TArE-OvER 67, 87 (A. Hacker ed. 1964). See
Latham, supra note 135, at 227-28.
137 Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Failures, Imperfections, and the Limits
of Economics, 19 KYvI.os 23 (1966).
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differ are often not presented by management to the community as
such but to its individual members in one or another of their par-
ticular capacities. For example, the community is not asked what kind
of automobile would best serve community needs; each individual
is given a choice of automobiles carefully designed to emphasize what
they can do for him, materially or psychologically. The community
is not asked what plant location would best serve community needs;
the landowners and potential employees in a particular area are se-
duced by the economic benefits that will flow to them personally from
location of the plant at a place that the management has determined
to be most profitable. In each case, the way in which the question is
presented determines the response, and the cumulation of responses
based on individual self-interest is adduced as proof that the manage-
ment's decisions were in accord with the community's interests since
they were endorsed by the members of the community.
This absence of arm's-length bargaining between management
and the community is justified by the argument that "public" interests
are represented by government, which, through its powers of regula-
tion, taxation, and spending, can effectively represent those interests
against the selfish interests of management and shareholders. Given
the great and increasing size of governmental bureaucracies and gov-
ernmental budgets, this argument has a certain plausibility. Yet given
the results of this "bargaining" to date, one comes away with the un-
easy feeling that the public interest has been had. But if government
has not been an effective bargaining agent, why not?
One weakness of government is that, except in the case of war,
we have conceived of it in this country as playing a largely passive
and responsive role. Government does not take the initiative; it re-
sponds to the initiatives of "businessmen." What is more, if govern-
ment disagrees with what businessmen want to do, government has
the burden of proof and must prove not simply that the businessman's
initiative will not advance the public interest but that it will cause
substantial harm. Given the great gaps in our understanding of, and
ability to forecast, scientific, social, and economic phenomena, this
can be a formidable task.
Of course, this traditional view of American government no
longer corresponds completely to reality. Government is increasingly
taking the initiative in many areas other than war and is utilizing
business corporations for public purposes. But even where govern-
ment has taken the initiative, it is still under a serious handicap in
dealing with corporate management because government is, more or
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less, democratically selected while corporate management is not. What
this means is that government decision makers must be responsive to
the interests of their electorate in all of its capacities-as workers, as
consumers, as shareholders, as landlords and as tenants, as walkers
and riders, as breathers, eaters, and what have you-while corporate
management decision makers are supposed to be guided by a single
arbitrary standard-profit. The management's electorate is not the
shareholders, but the shares. The "one share, one vote" system, the
institution of voting by proxy, and the use of record dates that result
in many votes being cast on behalf of people who are no longer share-
holders at the time of the meeting, all combine to depersonalize the
decisional process in corporate elections. The shareholder under the
present system is not voting as a person at all, but as the temporary
trustee of a piece of paper embodying values to which shareholders
and management alike have agreed to adhere in making their "cor-
porate" decisions, whether or not they accept them in their personal
lives.
Given this disparity, it is no wonder that corporate managements,
with power of disposition over aggregations of tangible and intangible
assets equal in magnitude to, and often far greater than, those avail-
able to government officials, are able to reach big and important
decisions regarding the utilization of those assets far more easily than
their government counterparts. Corporate managers enjoy the advan-
tages of speed, flexibility, and secrecy available to all autocrats, as well
as the assurance of certainty available to those who are permitted to
guide their actions by a single arbitrary standard. So long as we ac-
quiesce in their privileges we cannot expect an optimum balance
between public and private interests to be reached by a process of
negotiations between them and their more democratically-selected
counterparts in government. That balance will not be attainable until
a more democratic method of selection of corporate managers can be
substituted for the present rule of "one share, one vote."' 38
IV
EQuAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
In a series of cases beginning with Baker v. Garr,139 the.United
States Supreme Court has held that the provision of the fourteenth
138 Rostow describes the corporation with widely-scattered shareholders as "endo-
cratic." Rostow, supra note 107, at 47 n.2. The rule of one vote for each share may perhaps
be described as "plutocratic," but whatever the present system is, it is dearly not demo-
cratic.
139 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
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amendment prohibiting the states from denying to any person "equal
protection of the laws" means that when any public official or legisla-
tive body is elected by popular vote, the vote of one group of electors
may not be given greater weight than those of any other group. The
principal effect of these decisions has been on legislative bodies whose
members are elected from geographical constituencies. As to these,
the Court has established a rule of "one man, one vote," under which
there may not be any significant variation in the number of persons
represented by each member of the legislature. The rule has been ex-
tended from congressional1 40 and state legislative districts141 to local
governing bodies such as county commissions142 and even to a board
of trustees established for the purpose of managing a junior college.143
As Justice Black stated in the most recent of these decisions, "the
constant factor" leading to invocation of this constitutional principle
is "the decision of government to have citizens participate individually
by ballot in the selection of certain people who carry out govern-
mental functions."'"1
At the same time that the Supreme Court has been striking down
apportionments of voting power that give one person's vote greater
weight than another's, it has also been striking down, as a denial of
equal protection, various restrictions on the right of individuals to
vote in governmental elections. Among the limitations thus held in-
valid is the restriction of voting rights to property owners, either in
an election of school board members' 45 or in referenda to approve
the issuance of revenue bonds146 or general obligation bonds.1 47
In Cipriano v. City of Houma,14s the Court held that ownership
of real property could not be made a qualification for voting in a
referendum on the issuance of revenue bonds. The decision is partic-
ularly interesting because the bonds involved were to be issued to
finance the extension and improvement of gas, water, and electric
utility systems which in Houma happened to be operated by the city,
rather than by a "private" public utility. "The [State] maintain[ed]
that property owners have a 'special pecuniary interest' in the election,
because the efficiency of the utility system directly affects 'property and
140 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
141 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
142 Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
143 Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 897 U.S. 50 (1970).
144 Id. at 54.
145 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 US. 621 (1969).
146 Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
147 Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
148 595 U.S. 701 (1969).
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property values' and thus 'the basic security of their investment in
[their] property [is] at stake.' ,14 The Court held, however, that "the
operation of the utility systems .. . affects virtually every resident of
the city, nonproperty owners as well as property owners," and that
the vote could not constitutionally be limited to the "owners" of the
city.150 Even two Justices who had dissented from the decision that
ownership of property could not be made a qualification for voting
in school board elections concurred in this judgment on the ground
that it involved a voting classification "wholly irrelevant" to achieve-
ment of the state's objective.151
The Cipriano case is also interesting for another provision of the
challenged Louisiana statute, which was not specifically put in issue,
requiring that a utility revenue bond issue "must be approved by a
majority of the property taxpayers voting and their votes must also
represent a majority of the assessed property owned by those taxpayers
who are actually voting."' 52 In other words, not only were non-prop-
erty owners completely disfranchised, but even the desire of a majority
of the property owners to approve a bond issue could be overridden
by the votes of those who owned a majority in value of the city's assessed
property. The Supreme Court has not yet passed on the constitutional-
ity of such a provision, but it has agreed to decide whether the require-
ment of a greater-than-majority vote for approval of a bond issue is
constitutional.153 The California Supreme Court has recently held that
such a requirement violates the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment because it gives greater weight to a "no" vote than
a "yes" vote.'5
In Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,155 the Court extended the Cipriano
rule to cover referenda on general obligation bonds that were to be
serviced primarily out of property taxes. Even though property owners
in this case had a direct pecuniary interest in the question not shared
by other residents of the city, the Court held that the interest of other
citizens in the services to be provided from the proceeds of the bond
149 Id. at 704.
150 Id. at 705.
151 Id. at 707 (Black & Stewart, JJ., concurring).
152 LA. REv. STAT. § 89:501 (1950). Since the statute provides that only qualified
voters can participate in a bond issue election, a corporate landowner would not be
entitled to vote and its landholdings would therefore not be counted in determining
whether the issue was approved. See [1914-16] Ops. Arr'y GEN. LA. 894-96.
153 Gordon v. Lance, 170 S.E.2d 783 (W. Va. 1969), cert. granted, 897 U.S. 1020 (1970).
154 Alhambra City School Dist. v. Mize, 2 Cal. 8d 806, 471 P.2d 515, 87 Cal. Rptr. 867
(1970).
155 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
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issue, the provision that part of the debt service would be furnished
by non-property taxes, and the interest of tenants, as well as landlords,
in the level of real property taxes, made their exclusion from the refer-
endum unconstitutional. The Court stated:
Presumptively, when all citizens are affected in important ways
by a governmental decision subject to a referendum, the Constitu-
tion does not permit weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise
qualified citizens from the franchise.... Placing such power in
property owners alone can be justified only by some overriding in-
terest of those owners which the State is entitled to recognize.15 6
There is no question that the provisions of state corporation laws
regarding the election of corporate directors are "decision[s] of govern-
ment to have citizens participate individually by ballot in the selection
of . .." those directors. If the directors of business corporations, or
some of them, can be said to be "carrying out governmental functions,"
then there are obviously serious problems under the equal protection
clause in the exclusion of large classes of interested persons from the
electoral process and in the allocation of voting power among those
who are entitled to vote.157
A corporate charter is a grant of power by the state. In their earlier
form, each charter was granted as a separate act by the legislature to
named individuals to engage in specified activities. Gradually, state
governments were induced to relinquish their right to determine who
could incorporate so long as the corporation stayed out of certain activ-
ities that the states reserved for the regularly-elected government. How-
ever, the corporate charter remains a continuing grant of power by the
state to certain people-the "directors" of the corporation-to regulate
the disposition of large aggregations of capital and fixed assets and the
behavior of large numbers of people.
Is this a "governmental" function? Traditionally, it has been con-
sidered that the function of government is to regulate and the function
of business is to produce. But there is no clear dividing line. Govern-
ment is engaged in many "productive" activities, including the post
office, municipal utility systems such as that operated by the city of
Houma, as well as the much more economically significant activities
of military production and highway building. And business is engaged
in regulation-of production, of distribution, of competition, and of
156 Id. at 209.
157 The question here is whether business corporations should be studied as political
institutions, not whether they can be. The latter question has been pretty well answered
in the affirmative. See, e.g., A. BERL, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPrTALIST REVOLUTION
(1954); W. HAMLTON, THE POLmCS OF INDUSTRY (1957); Latham, supra note 135, at 218.
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many other aspects of the economy. The more concentrated an indus-
try becomes, the greater the regulatory component of the decisions of
industrial managers. The division of industrial governmental jurisdic-
tions along chiefly functional, rather than geographical, lines should
not obscure the basic similarity. The production and distribution of
automobiles is governed by the managers of the four major automobile
producers just as the geographical area of New England is governed by
the local and state governments of six states. In neither case can one
government operate in disregard of what "competing" governments
are doing. A man can change his citizenship (i.e., residence) from one
state to another just as he can transfer his citizenship (i.e., employment
or customer relationship) from one automobile manufacturer to an-
other. But a man's ability to switch his allegiance from one state to an-
other has never been thought to justify excluding him from an equal
voice in the government of the state while he is there, and there is no
intrinsic reason why the same principle should not be applicable to his
corporate allegiances.
No generalizations can be made about the extent to which busi-
ness corporations exercise "governmental" powers. The corporations
organized under a single law may range from a monopoly public util-
ity corporation or massive industrial enterprise with widely scattered
shareholders, employees, and customers to a small shop or business
with one owner, no employees, and one or a handful of customers. It
is neither feasible nor necessary to introduce public selection of man-
agement into the latter corporation, while the managers of the former
type are performing functions that can well be classified as "govern-
mental" and are indeed performed by elected government officials in
many localities.
In a series of cases applying the equal protection clause to dis-
crimination against black people, the Supreme Court has been re-
quired to determine whether the discrimination is purely "private"
or involves "state action" which brings it within the prohibition of
the fourteenth amendment. While other members of the Court have
been trying to analyze the cases by the degree of involvement with the
official state or local "government," Justice Douglas has been attempt-
ing to enunciate a formula under which certain activities that are es-
sentially "governmental" in nature would be subject to the strictures
of the equal protection clause even when they were undertaken by
"private" groups or organizations. He has applied this reasoning to the
operation of a public restaurant, because "state licensing and surveil-
lance.., brings its service into the public domain" and makes the res-
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taurant an "instrumentality of the state"; 158 to a privately-owned park,
because a park's function of "mass recreation" is "municipal in na-
ture"; 159 and to group action to maintain segregated neighborhoods,
because "zoning is a state and municipal function" that the state may
not suffer "to be performed under private auspices in a way the state
itself may not act."' 60
The equal protection clause has two facets. It forbids discrimina-
tion by public agencies when they act on individual members of the
community, and it forbids discrimination in the process by which the
directors of public agencies are chosen and controlled. Justice Douglas
has been concerned primarily with the first facet-racial discrimina-
tion in the operation of public facilities.' 61 Our concern here is with
the second facet--discrimination in the selection of corporate direc-
tors. I would argue that, just as when a group or organization becomes
subject to the equal protection clause in its first aspect when it pre-
sumes to perform a public function, so a corporation or other organi-
zation becomes subject to the clause in its second aspect when its di-
rectors presume to govern the conduct of its operations on behalf of
a public electorate and cease to be the instrumentality of a single per-
son, or closely-associated group, which can be considered the "owner"
of the enterprise in the traditional sense.'6 2 In other words, the elec-
tion of corporate directors becomes subject to the equal protection
clause when the corporation makes a public offering of its securities. 163
It should be noted that Justice Douglas's redefinition of the line
158 Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 282-83 (1963) (concurring opinion).
159 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 801 (1966) (opinion of the Court).
160 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 384 (1967) (concurring opinion). It has been
suggested that "with the continuing 'pluralizing' of American society and the increasing
recognition of the governmental power of private groups, . . . the trend of the Court
in 'public-izing' private groups . . .. should become the important constitutional law
development of the midtwentieth century." Miller, Private Governments and the Constitu-
tion, in THE CORPORATION TAKE-OvER, supra note 136, at 122, 140.
161 Adolf Berle's suggestions for applying constitutional limitations to powerful
business corporations have also concentrated on this facet of the equal protection clause,
as well as on the due process clause. See Berle, Economic Power and the Free Society, in
THE CORPORATION TAxE-OVER, supra note 136, at 91, 105 (1963); Berle, The Developing
Law of Corporate Concentration, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 639, 657 (1952).
162 Or, as Galbraith would put it, when it passes from the "Entrepreneurial" to the
"Mature" stage. Note 89 and accompanying text supra.
163 There are, of course, some corporations that become "Mature" while still pri-
vately-held, just as there are some that make public offerings of shares (often with disas-
trous results to the purchasers) while they are still in the "Entrepreneurial" stage. In
most cases, however, the public offering, with the attendant invocation of federal securities
regulations, is probably the best place to draw the line.
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between "public" and "private" has not gone unquestioned even
within the Court. Justice Harlan has observed
a clash of competing constitutional claims of a high order: liberty
and equality. Freedom of the individual to choose his associates or
his neighbors, to use and dispose of his property as he sees fit, to be
irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even unjust in his personal rela-
tions are things all entitled to a large measure of protection from
governmental interference. This liberty would be overriden, in the
name of equality, if the strictures of the amendment were applied
to governmental and private action without distinction. 64
By this statement, however, Justice Harlan has strengthened the case
for making the election of directors of publicly-held corporations sub-
ject to the equal protection clause because those in control of the cor-
porate assets are clearly not "individuals free to use and dispose of [their]
property as [they see] fit, to be irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even un-
just . . . ."; they are, by their own admission, the governors of that
property, under a grant of power from the state, on behalf of wide and
diversified constituencies.
V
WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
If what I have written thus far is to be believed, the rule of "one
share, one vote" represents an aberration in historical development, is
widely departed from in other countries, facilitates trafficking in con-
trol and the development of unhealthy conglomerates, is vesting in-
creasing power in the hands of financial managers who have neither
the desire nor the ability to exercise it, inhibits democratic decision
making on important social and economic issues, and is of dubious
constitutionality.
It is much easier (and much more enjoyable) to poke holes in an
existing system than to devise a better one. But the current dissatis-
faction with the operation of our corporate governments provides a
tempting opportunity to sketch the rough outline of a new system that
might encourage, rather than discourage, corporate managers to use
the assets at their command in a manner that is more responsive to the
needs of those affected by their decisions.
One possible route is government selection of corporate managers.
However, the experience of countries that have nationalized basic in-
dustries, such as England, does not give any assurance that the benefits
164 Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963) (separate opinion).
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of that extreme procedure would justify the economic dislocations
involved, 6 5 except perhaps in a few really sick industries, such as rail-
roads, where any change could hardly fail to be an improvement. Ex-
amples of government selection of representatives who would consti-
tute a minority of a board of directors of an essentially profit-oriented
corporation have been generally discouraging. 16  Furthermore, we are
now sufficiently confused about our national goals that centralized
planning of economic activity has lost much of whatever appeal it for-
merly had. An adaptation of the ideas of economic federalism, in which
the selection of the managers of each corporate government would be
ratified by a distinct electorate of real people, may offer the best oppor-
tunity for experimentation with the management of these vast aggrega-
tions of physical and contractual assets to determine what approaches
best meet America's current economic and social needs.
Assuming that we should begin to consider limitations on the vot-
ing rights of large shareholders in order to increase the democratic ele-
ment in the selection of corporate management, what is our starting
point? A return to the basic democratic principle of "one man, one
vote" is appealing, although appropriately scaled-down voting rights
for large shareholders, or fixed upper limits such as that found in the
Volkswagen charter,167 might be more palatable at the start. The ques-
tions are how such a system would meet the objections to the present
system which I have outlined above, what new problems it might raise,
and what affirmative benefits it might produce.
First, why or how would such a system survive the forces that led
to its abandonment in American and English law in the mid-nine-
teenth century and that have caused criticism in the civil law systems
where it is still maintained?
There is little hard evidence as to why the restrictions all but dis-
appeared during the nineteenth century, but one can speculate that
there were several reasons:
1. The restrictions were inconsistent with the laissez-faire philos-
ophy of giving entrepreneurs maximum freedom in determining how
to run their business affairs.
2. The substitution of general incorporation laws for special acts
of incorporation meant that a corporation would not have a statutory
165 See Crosland, The Private and Public Corporation in Great Britain, in THE
CORPORATION IN MODERN SocIrrY, supra note 107, at 260, 267-73.
106 See Schwartz, Governmentally Appointed Directors in a Private Corporation-The
Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HA-v. L. REv. 350 (1965).
167 Notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra.
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monopoly of its "line of commerce" and that the external control
afforded by competition supplanted the internal control provided by
voting restrictions. 168
3. The restrictions were relatively easy to evade, at least as long
as the corporation had relatively few stockholders. Once an unsympa-
thetic court had held that it would not inquire into the reasons for a
transfer of shares,169 it was a simple matter for a substantial stockholder
to increase his voting power by transferring shares to his relatives or
others who would vote as he directed.
How persuasive are these considerations today?
1. The doctrine of laissez-faire is limited by the idea that business
corporations can be and are regulated when it is decided that the pub-
lic interest requires regulation. The question now is whether restric-
tion of the voting rights of large shareholders is desirable.
2. Anyone can still form a corporation to manufacture automo-
biles, for example, but the problem of turning the corporation into an
automobile manufacturer is something else again. At least in the oli-
gopolistic industries, there is a serious question as to what competition
is doing to protect the "public" interest. To the extent that the exter-
nal controls of the market become less effective, the desirability of in-
ternal controls gains significance 70
3. As long as there are restrictions, methods will be devised to
avoid them. But if a corporation has 100,000 shareholders, a large
shareholder would have to be unusually fecund or gregarious to find
sufficient relatives or friends to increase his voting power by transfers
to dummies.
In short, while there may be persuasive arguments against impos-
ing restrictions on the one vote per share rule at the present time, his-
tory does not indicate insuperable obstacles; it does indicate possible
forms the restrictions might take.
Second, would the proposed change eliminate, or even ameliorate,
the "control" problem discussed above: the situation where the holders
168 It is interesting that voting restrictions were more prevalent in the general and
special laws relating to "quasi-public" corporations, such as banks and transportation
companies, than they were in the laws relating to manufacturing companies.
169 Moffatt v. Farquhar, 7 Ch. D. 591 (1878).
170 [I]t would be interesting to see if replacing the Sherman anti-trust law by
the assurance of a republican form of government to all private corporations
would not take the strain off the heavily pressed executive and hasten the present
tendency of the business corporation to accept more community responsibilities.
Buchanan, The Corporation and the Republic, in THE CORPORATION TARE-OvER, supra
note 136, at 19, 36.
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of a majority, or substantial minority, of the shares exercise effective
control because the remaining shareholders are not united on any com-
petitive course of action? Although the proposed change would, by
its basic nature, eliminate the possibility that any one man, or small
group of men, could achieve this degree of control, it does leave open
the possibility of one of the corporation's larger constituencies, say, its
employees, exercising the effective choice of management and installing
a management that would run the corporation for their benefit to the
detriment of consumers, creditors, equity investors, and the general
community.
I believe this danger is more theoretical than real. Getting 100,000
voters to cast their votes for a particular slate is not nearly so easy as
getting one man to cast 100,000 votes for that slate, particularly where
the people involved must take an affirmative action (i.e., become share-
holders) before they are entitled to vote at all. The likelihood would
be that only where management consistently ignored the interests of an
important group would that group be motivated to amass sufficient
voting power to change the management.
Even if one particular interest group were to obtain "control" and
attempt to operate the corporation without regard to the interests of
other constituencies, the latter groups would be able, by promoting
the purchase of shares by their own members and others sympathetic
to their objectives, to acquire sufficient voting power either to turn out
the incumbent management or to require that management to give at-
tention to their interests. Unlike the present situation, in which the
management, supported by the holder or holders of a majority of the
outstanding shares, can never be turned out of office, a group that held
a majority of the votes under a per capita voting system could never be
sure that another group might not obtain a majority within a short pe-
riod by dispersal of, and additions to, its holdings.
To provide immediate remedies for gross disregard of manage-
ment obligations to one of its constituencies, a shareholder should have
recourse to the courts, as he has now, suing either as representative of
a group of shareholders or derivatively on behalf of "the corporation."
The difficult question is the extent to which the court, in such a situa-
tion, should recognize the interest of the complaining shareholder as
an employee, or as a consumer, or as anything other than an owner of
a share in the equity.171 If the management does have a responsibility
171 In DeRosa v. Terry Steam Turbine Co., 26 Conn. Supp. 11, 214 A.2d 684
(Super. Ct. 1965), three employees of a company, who were also members of the union
negotiating committee, each purchased one share of stock in the company and requested
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to these other groups, their interests should presumably be given recog-
nition by the courts. This does not mean that management should be
found delinquent because in a certain situation, faced with alternative
courses of action, it has chosen one that is more beneficial to equity
owners and less beneficial to employees, or more beneficial to creditors
and less beneficial to equity owners, or the like. However, it would be
appropriate to hold management liable where it utterly failed to con-
sider the interests of one of its constituencies or otherwise dealt un-
fairly with them. 72
permission to inspect the company's list of shareholders for the purpose of apprising the
shareholders prior to the annual meeting of "certain facts relating to labor relations of
the company ... ." Id. at 133, 214 A.2d at 685-86. Connecticut corporation law provided
that such a list "shall be subject to inspection by any shareholder . . . for any proper
purpose in the interest of the shareholder as such or of the corporation and not . . for
any purpose inimical to the interest of the corporation or of its shareholders." CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-333 (1960). The company denied the request on the ground that it
was not made in their interest as shareholders and was inimical to the interest of the
company. The court held that since the employee-shareholders "wish[ed] to communicate
with the shareholders in respect to matters of interest and legitimate concern to the
shareholders and to the company," they were entitled to inspect the list, and that their
affiliation with the union did not "in any way impair the[ir] status . . . as shareholders."
Id. at 138, 214 A.2d at 688.
172 The problem is analogous to one that can arise in corporations that have more
than one class of stock. In one case, Transamerica Corporation had an outstanding issue
of convertible preferred shares the holders of which were entitled to receive $240 per
share upon liquidation, but only $81 per share if the shares were called for redemption
(which the board could do at any time). The board redeemed the preferred shares and then
proceeded to liquidate the corporation. The court said that the board, acting in the interest
of the holder of a majority of the common shares, had violated its duty to the preferred share-
holders by calling their shares for redemption at the lower price. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp.,
162 F.2d 36,46 (3d Cir. 1947). Viewed alone, this would place an impossible burden on a man-
agement faced with responsibility to act in the best interests of both its preferred and
common shareholders. But in subsequent proceedings, the court approved a recovery by
the preferred shareholders, not of the difference between the redemption price and the
liquidation preference but of the difference between the redemption price and the amount
the preferred shareholders would have received if they had converted their preferred
into common shares instead of surrendering them for redemption. Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 235 F.2d 369, 874 (3d Cir. 1956). It thus appeared that the real offense the directors
had committed was not their redemption of the preferred shares. Their failure to do
so, when they clearly had authority, would have subjected them to legitimate criticism
by the common shareholders. Rather, it lay in their concealment from the preferred
shareholders of information that would have made clear that it was in their best interest
to convert their shares, rather than to surrender them for redemption.
The Transamerica cases do not even begin to answer the specific questions that would
arise if the courts attempted to determine the bounds of management discretion in bal-
ancing the interests, not merely of different classes of shareholders, but of classes of
shareholders with entirely different kinds of interests in the corporation. But if the
responsibility does exist, there must be a means by which" it can be made effective; and
when a constituent of the corporation alleges that the management has failed in its
responsibilities to the group of which he is a member, the courts must determine, pos-
sibly with legislative aid, whether this is so and what should be done about it.
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Third, what effect would the change in voting rights have on cor-
porate take-overs? It would undoubtedly make it easier for the manage-
ment of a locally-controlled, relatively unaggressive company to resist
a take-over motivated by stock market considerations. Our re-examina-
tion of priorities and goals, however, is already leading us to question
whether a management using the corporate assets to produce steady
employment for its work force and a modest return for its investors
may not be doing a socially useful job for employees, consumers, and
other significant constituencies. And assuming that there are at least
some take-overs that can be considered beneficial to all interest groups,
it is arguable whether reduction of the voting power of large share-
holders would in fact prevent a new, more aggressive, more imaginative
management from taking over by carrying its argument for change to
a dissatisfied corporate electorate. It might even make the process ea-
sier, since it would enable men long on ideas and ability but short on
funds to compete for management positions without being forced to
pay a premium for a "controlling block" of shares, a method of taking
control which practically assures that a successful group will seek to
recoup its excess investment at the expense of the other shareholders'1 3
Fourth, the question of institutional investors. It would hardly
lie in the mouths of the institutional managers to complain about be-
ing deprived of votes that they have so clearly indicated they do not
want. Reducing the voting power of large blocks of shares might actu-
ally make their investment job easier. As these institutions grow to
mammoth size, they find their opportunities for equity investments
limited to the very largest publicly-held corporations, which are the
only ones in which they can invest their millions without finding them-
selves, willy-nilly, in control because of the number of votes they can
cast. If they could purchase larger percentage interests in smaller com-
panies without automatically acquiring the control position they say
they do not want, the access of the smaller companies to the principal
equity capital markets might be improved.1'7 4
173 Of course, those who gain control of a corporation by means of a proxy fight are
also entitled to reimburse themselves out of corporate assets for the cost of the campaign,
at least where it involves questions of policy and the payment is ratified by a vote of the
shareholders. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 809 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d
291 (1955); Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); see Campbell v. Loew's,
Inc., 87 Del. Ch. 17, 184 A.2d 852 (1957). However, explicit reimbursement in these cir-
cumstances seems not only appropriate but consistent with the current suggestions that
government should help finance political campaigns to prevent major elective offices from
becoming the exclusive preserve of the rich.
174 Depriving a large shareholder of his voting rights would not, of course, eliminate
his influence on company policies resulting from the ever-present threat that he might
clobber the market price of the company's shares by dumping large blocks on the market.
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Fifth, would the proposed change in the electorate really change
the issues and responses in corporate elections, or would it simply, as
Rostow suggests, add "new groups of apathetic and disinterested voters
to the masses of stockholders who now fail to exercise their franchise
intelligently"?175 This is, of course, impossible to forecast, but it seems
to me that it would inevitably have far greater potential than the pres-
ent system for producing public discussion of the social and economic
policy issues that corporate managers have to face in the context of
ratifying the selection of those managers. At the very least, it would
remove the inhibiting effect that the present plutocratic voting system
has on those managers who have the imagination and competence to
turn their companies' assets to more constructive uses.
Sixth, and most important, if the change in corporate voting pro-
cedures does change the orientation of corporate management, will
that change be toward a fairer and more rational allocation of benefits
between competing social and economic groups, or will it simply create
new islands of privilege that will be more effectively insulated from
central government intervention by an appearance of democracy? Here
the results would probably be spotty, varying greatly from industry to
industry and from company to company. However, since today's cor-
porate managers, in making their supposedly "technological" or "eco-
nomic" decisions, are in fact making the decisions that shape society,1'76
the balancing process can hardly be less responsive to group needs than
it is now.
The managers themselves are beginning to recognize the need to
hear from someone outside the financial establishment in their board
deliberations. John Bunting, the president of the largest bank in Phil-
adelphia, recently disclosed that he is "contemplating the possibility
of turning up to a third of the bank's 24 board seats over to consumer
representatives, young adults, employes, blacks, poor people and per-
haps even militant feminists.'- 77 If representatives of such "non-finan-
This, however, is one aspect of an entirely separate problem which is probably going to
require restrictions on the trading practices of institutional investors.
175 Rostow, supra note 107, at 56.
176 See A. HACKER, Tnm END OF THE AmEucAN ERA 88-76 (1970).
177 Morris, A Banker's Startling Idea on Directors, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1970, at 14,
col. 4. In contrast, General Motors's response to Campaign GM has been the appointment
of a "public policy committee" of five of its directors, described by the chairman as
having "a broad and diverse background reflecting their deep interest in social, environ-
mental and other concerns." The five are the chairmen of the boards of Mellon Bank,
Allied Chemical Co., and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the president of Marshall
Field & Co., and a former vice chairman of GM. A spokesman for Campaign GM was
"dismayed to observe that [the committee] suffers from the same parochialism as the board
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cial" interest groupings are to be selected, it is not too late to begin
thinking about how their selection is to be legitimized, if the process
is designed to assure members of the groups involved that "their" in-
terests are being represented.
It will of course be argued that subjecting corporations to demo-
cratic rule will simultaneously subject them to the delays, confusion,
and political intrigues that afflict all democratic governments, and thus
impair their efficiency and productivity, the supposed ultimate source
of all the benefits, economic and social, in American life. If we accept
the classical arbitrary economic definitions of efficiency and productiv-
ity, democratic rule probably would impair them. 78 We can further
grant that a high level of business efficiency and productivity was re-
quired to lift the national community to a certain level of economic
sufficiency that could support the social benefits we now enjoy. We can
question, however, whether that same efficiency and productivity has
become to some extent counter-productive in terms of the quality of
human life in the society that it has spawned.
There are many situations in which special exceptions or incen-
tives are allowed to new and developing enterprises and systems, which
become undesirable and even dangerous when allowed to continue af-
ter the enterprise or system has become large and well-entrenched. The
patent system is one example. A patent is a deliberate exception to the
generally-accepted rule that no man should be able to prevent others
from competing with him in a particular line of business. In its orig-
inal conception, it was an appropriate way to encourage invention and
improvement by giving the individual an opportunity to profit from
his ingenuity when his invention was made available to the public.
But now that most research is carried on by employees of large institu-
tions-corporations, government, and universities-the patent system
has become, to a large extent, a mechanism for restraining economic
competition and hindering, rather than fostering, the process by which
new inventions are made available to the public. 7 9
The laws excepting the managers of large corporate enterprises
from our generally-accepted rules for democratic selection of those who
run our institutions may be in the same category. Developed in the
itself," and Ralph Nader characterized it as "genuinely preposterous." N.Y. Times, Sept. 1,
1970, at 1, col. 3 (city ed.); id. at 58, col. 2.
178 Even on those terms, we may wish to question whether we are more concerned
with "good government" or "self-government." See Mason, Introduction to Tm CORPORA-
TION IN MODERN Socirry, supra note 107, at 6.
179 See Schmookler, Technological Progress and the.Modern American Corporation, in
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN Socm-ry, supra note 107, at 141.
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nineteenth century as an incentive to industrial development and as an
exception to the established rules that the managers of productive, as
well as regulatory, agencies should be selected by democratic proce-
dures, they have now become, to a large extent, a method for frustrat-
ing democratic decision making and hindering, rather than fostering,
the rational allocation of economic and social benefits.180
The last question that I raised about the rule of "one share, one
vote" was its constitutionality under the equal protection clause. The
question now becomes whether it is possible to design a system of cor-
porate voting that meets the constitutional standard.181 The difficulty,
described above, of defining the boundaries of the corporation's con-
stituencies indicated that giving one vote to each shareholder might be
the most effective way of approaching the ideal. But if all "citizens" of
the corporation are entitled to vote, the use of share ownership to de-
termine eligibility to vote may be considered the equivalent of a poll
tax. The Supreme Court has said that a poll tax is unconstitutional,
that "a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment
of any fee an electoral standard."'81 2 It might therefore be necessary to
require publicly-held corporations to issue, upon request and without
charge, voting shares of a special class carrying no dividend or liquida-
tion rights.18 3 Limitations could be placed on the number of corpora-
tions of which a single individual could become an elector in this man-
ner, just as a person's participation in present governmental elections
is limited to the jurisdictions of which he is an official "resident."
180 A distinguished legal historian has recently made the point that the power
wielded by corporate managers must be legitimized by social utility and social responsi-
bility. J. HugsTr, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNrrED STATES 58 (1970). He notes that the utility aspect dominated public policy toward
corporations from the 1880's into the 1930's, because "we treated the corporate instrument
as so useful for desired economic growth as to warrant using law to make it available on
terms most responsive to businessmen's needs or wishes." Id. at 62. Since the 1930's, how-
ever, interest conflicts have shown up the insufficiency of the utility approach and led to
a variety of attempts to enforce social responsibility, which "expresses the prime emphasis
this culture puts on the individual as the ultimate measure of institutions." Id. at 58.
181 Commentators are fond of quoting William Graham Sumner's statement that
"industry may be republican; it can never be democratic." E.g., Latham, The Common-
wealth of the Corporation, 55 Nw. U.L. Rav. 25, 33 (1960).
182 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
183 The validity of a class of stock of this type was recently upheld by an Illinois
court on the ground that the corporation law did not require that voting shareholders
have any interest in the assets or earnings of the company (the shares in that case, of
course, had been issued to the promoters of the company for the purpose of preserving
their control vis-A-vis public investors). Stroh v. Blackhawk Holding Corp., 117 II. App.
2d 801, 253 N.E.2d 692 (1969).
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If selection of corporate officers is to become truly "democratic,"
it will of course require the organization of some sort of "political par-
ties" to stimulate and mobilize group interests in anticipation of the
vote.8 -8 Currently, the Securities and Exchange Commission has, and
exercises, a comprehensive power of censorship over what can be said,
and when and how it can be said, when proxies are being solicited
from shareholders, either in connection with a contest for control or
for an uncontested election or ratification. So long as the appeals are
solely to the shareholder's economic self-interest, these restrictions pre-
sumably escape first amendment prohibitions by falling within the rec-
ognized exception for government regulation of purely commercial en-
ticements.'8 5 However, with the recent decision in Medical Committee
for Human Rights v. SEC"' and the introduction of Senator Muskie's
"Corporate Participation Act,"'18 7 shareholders' votes may increasingly
be solicited on a range of social and economic questions as to which
any form of government or other censorship would be of dubious con-
stitutionality.88
Apart from changes in the electoral process, a good deal more
thought must be given to the internal structure of the corporate gov-
ernment. At present, business corporations operate under a legal frame-
184 One important question that will arise is whether voting by proxy should
continue to be permitted, and if so, what modifications will be required. While proxy
voting under the present rules has been primarily an instrument for management to
legitimize itself, some means will have to be found to enable large groups of geographically-
scattered shareholders to express themselves simultaneously in an election, and the proxy
system, with appropriate modifications, may provide the most workable approach. It is
not too different in mechanics, after all, from the electoral college system for election of
the President.
In addition, the continuation of a substantial quorum requirement will be necessary
to provide management with an incentive to encourage voting. The directors of mutual
insurance companies are theoretically elected by a vote of policyholders, and "each
policyholder has one vote regardless of the number of policies held and regardless of its
or their value." Hetherington, Fact v. Fiction: Who Owns Mutual Insurance Companies,
1969 Wis. L. REv. 1068, 1080 (footnote omitted). However, in the absence of meaningful
quorum or notice requirements, the directors of the 10 largest mutual life insurance
companies, ranging in size from one million to 22 million policyholders, were returned
to office in 1968 by elections in which the number of votes cast ranged from 47 to 4,181.
Id. at 1079.
185 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 816 US. 52 (1942); cf. Talley v. California, 362 US.
60 (1960).
186 BNA Sac. Rim. & L. REP. No. 59, at D-1 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 1970); text accompanying
notes 116-17 supra.
187 Text accompanying notes 119-21 supra.
188 The SEC was confronted with this problem when it attempted to apply its
proxy rules to a group soliciting AT&T shareholders for authority to represent their
interests in an FCC hearing on telephone rates. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1966, at 77, col. 8;
id., Oct. 15, 1966, at 85, col. 8.
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work which specifies simply that there be a board of directors respon-
sible for the conduct of the corporation's affairs. Little attention has
been paid to this rather primitive legal structure, largely because the
board of directors, as such, seldom performs any significant function.
Its members are selected by the management group to serve as dum-
mies, or as window dressing, or to provide information or mutually
advantageous contacts with corporations in other lines of activity, or
as a reward for hard-working executives. 18 9 But if it is possible to devise
an electoral system under which delegates to the corporate government
campaign on issues and purport to represent interest groups, the leg-
islative and executive authority within the company will have to be
much more carefully spelled out.
One possibility would be the division of the functions of the board
of directors between an elected board, which would be responsible
for "legislative" policy determinations, and an administrative board
appointed by the legislative board (or possibly headed by a directly-
elected chief executive), which would be responsible for the company's
day-to-day operations.190 A further extension of federalist principles
might indicate that companies with plants in more than one place
should have locally-selected boards responsible for aspects of the com-
pany's operation that are of particular concern to the local commu-
nity.191
One of the major rallying points of those who profess to espouse
the cause of "corporate democracy" has been the institution of cumu-
lative voting. Cumulative voting is the corporate analogue of propor-
tional representation, a system which, despite its theoretical appeal,
has been generally discarded in American politics. In government,
there is much to be said for forcing the many special-interest groups
in society to compromise and consolidate their positions through the
medium of the political campaign rather than in the deliberative and
administrative process of the government itself. Similarly, in the cor-
poration, a winner-take-all system may make its own special kind of
sense by forcing the incumbent management, and any group that seeks
189 Professor Myles L. Mace of Harvard Business School asserts that "[o]utside direc-
tors of big, widely owned corporations are typically prestige names from other companies
and extremely busy people .... They're often cronies of the president and don't have
a hell of a lot of motivation to spend time learning about the company or industry."
Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1970, at 1, col. 6.
190 A somewhat similar division of functions is prescribed in the German corporation
law. For an evaluation see Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from
the German, 80 HI-Iv. L. REy. 23, 48-64 (1966).
191 See Long, The Corporation, Its Satellites, and the Local Community, in Tr
CORPORATION IN MODERN Sociry, supra note 107, at 202.
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to overthrow it, to justify its positions to a wide enough spectrum of
the corporation's constituencies to achieve an overall majority, rather
than directing its appeals to a more limited group whose proportion
of votes exceeds the magic formula of X/Y + 1 necessary to place a
nettlesome minority of X on the board of Y directors.
Under the present system of per-share voting, it really makes little
difference whether cumulative voting is permitted or not since there is
no form or definition to the constituency except to the extent that it
represents the theory that "money talks." But if the substitution of per-
capita for per-share voting does actually have the effect of increasing
participation by employees, customers, and members of other commu-
nities of interest in corporate elections, it is arguable that representa-
tives of the views of those groups should sit on the board of directors,
even if they could not amass enough votes to elect the entire board.
CODA
Corporate democracy may yet prove to be a will-o'-the-wisp. It will
take a good deal of persuasive argument to convince the Supreme
Court to apply the rule of "one man, one vote" to business corpora-
tions, even the biggest ones. The Bar Association Committees who
have been playing Corporations I are not yet ready to change the rules
so as to make the game more like Corporations III. No bill will be in-
troduced in the Delaware legislature to impose restrictions on the vot-
ing rights of large shareholders.
There is growing dissatisfaction, however, inside as well as outside
the business establishment, with the way business corporations are
managed and with the way in which the managers are selected. No
longer can one say, as Rostow did ten years ago:
There seems to be no general conviction abroad that reform is
needed. The vehement feelings of the early thirties, expressing a
sense of betrayal and frustration at a depression blamed on twelve
years of business leadership, are almost entirely absent. 92
The feelings today may be closer to those of the Thirties than those
of the Fifties. There are widespread vehement feelings that business
leadership, freed from democratic controls, is leading us toward an in-
tolerable environment and a disoriented society. The purpose of this
article is to suggest that, at least in the area of selection and ratification
of corporate management, the models and concepts developed in the
192 Rostow, supra note 107, at 59.
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late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to facilitate a process of
rapid industrial expansion may not be our most appropriate starting
point for the reordering of corporate government.
Of the agencies available, Congress is probably in the best position
to effect a restructuring that actually makes corporate management
more responsive to national needs. But there should first be a detailed
study, by a congressional committee or presidential commission, of the
alternative methods available for the selection of corporate managers
and how well each of them could be expected to serve this objective.
I have focused on voting rights because I believe that a periodic gen-
eral plebiscite is the most effective way of achieving responsiveness on
the part of the governors and acceptance on the part of the governed.
